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ABSTRACT
Many dams throughout New England are approaching the end of their
engineered lifespan. Individual dam owners and governments at various levels find
themselves navigating decisions to repair, remove, or modify the aging infrastructure.
These decisions have implications for the ecosystem services that depend on the
presence or absence of dams. By coordinating the ecosystem service tradeoffs at large
scales we can more efficiently utilize the productive capacity of river systems.
Implementing a large-scale coordinated approach, however, requires understanding
stakeholder preferences at different scales, and the willingness of decision makers to
coordinate (or not). In this dissertation I address issues surrounding a coordinated
approach to ecosystem service provision with the goal of facilitating better decisions.
In the first chapter, I administer a choice experiment survey to study how
environmental risk preferences interact with scale to determine willingness to pay for
ecosystem services from dam removal. Improved understanding of scale-dependent
preferences can allow nonmarket valuation estimates for ecosystem services to
integrate more smoothly into decisions at a variety of scales. In the second chapter, I
explore environmental federalism in dam removal decisions (i.e., whether state goals
diverge from larger-scale optimization). I use matching and instrumental variable
techniques to model the determinants of dam removal using a large, spatially explicit
dataset. Results suggest that states consider border proximity when selecting dams for
removal, indicating a need for new incentive structures to realize efficiency gains from
coordination. In the final chapter, I study how a production possibilities model can be
combined with public preference data from a choice experiment, expressed as

indifference curves, to identify socially preferred ecosystem service outcomes from
dam removal. I find that the approach is useful for pinpointing areas of agreement and
disagreement between stakeholder groups with varying preferences.
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PREFACE
I use manuscript format for this dissertation. There are three independent
chapters which constitute the entire work. The goal of this dissertation is to apply
economic concepts to improve the ecosystem service outcomes associated with dam
removal decisions. The first chapter is co-authored with Emi Uchida and Samuel G.
Roy. It is being prepared for submission to the Environmental and Resource
Economics. The second manuscript is co-authored with Emi Uchida. It is being
prepared for submission to Land Economics. The third manuscript is co-authored with
Emi Uchida and Samuel G. Roy. It is being prepared for submission to Ecology and
Society.
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ABSTRACT
In stated preference studies, willingness to pay estimates sometimes fails to
increase with the quantity of an environmental good. This theoretical inconsistency
leads to errors when performing benefit transfer and has been used to question the
validity of nonmarket valuation. This study tests whether this inconsistency can be
partially explained by how individual risk preferences interact with geographic and
quantitative scales. To address this question, we administer a split-sample choice
experiment with a scale treatment, and model the data using different assumptions
about risk aversion. We find that respondents exhibit a higher degree of risk aversion
at larger geographic and quantitative scales of the nonmarket good, and a model
incorporating risk aversion eliminates between-scale benefit transfer errors for a
subset of respondents. In addition, we subject our choice experiment to a novel
between-sample scope test, showing that the interaction of risk aversion with scale is a
significant driver of scope response. Our results make the case for including a risk
preference elicitation among standard debriefing questions in stated preference
surveys.
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1. Introduction

In stated preference studies for nonmarket goods, willingness to pay sometimes
lacks sensitivity to the quantity of the good on offer (Desvousges et al., 2012). Known
as failure to demonstrate scope in the contingent valuation literature, a number of
studies were unable to demonstrate increasing willingness to pay for increasing
quantities of an environmental good (e.g., Boyle et al., 1994; Fischhoff et al., 1993;
Kahneman and Knetsch, 1992). In a discrete choice experiment setting, marginal
willingness to pay may depend on the scale at which it is elicited (Bueren and Bennett,
2004; Rolfe and Windle, 2008). If marginal values derived at a relatively small (large)
scale are relatively large (small), estimates of total value could be decreasing with the
magnitude of environmental change. Scale dependency of marginal values in choice
experiments are virtually unstudied relative to scope response in contingent valuation,
despite their relatedness. We explore scale dependency in the context of uncertainty,
an increasingly common component of choice experiments.
Uncertainty is inherent in environmental decision-making (Pindyck, 2006).
Respondents to stated preference surveys face uncertainties from several sources
surrounding the ultimate delivery of the outcome being valued (e.g., environmental,
modeling, and political uncertainty). A growing number of nonmarket valuation
studies show that explicit inclusion of uncertainty in a valuation task alters preferences
(e.g., Lundhede et al., 2015; Makriyannis et al., 2018; Roberts et al., 2008). Still, our
understanding of how people respond to environmental uncertainty is lacking
compared to well-established domains like financial uncertainty. Of relevance to our
3

investigation of scale dependency is that people become more averse to financial risk
as the scale of payoffs becomes larger (Binswanger, 1980; Bosch-Domènech and
Silvestre, 1999; Holt and Laury, 2002).
Our paper studies the relationship between environmental risk aversion and
scale, and explores implications for stated preference nonmarket valuation studies.
Using choices between incentivized lotteries in a lab, Holt and Laury (2002) found
subjects made fewer risky choices when the monetary stakes were scaled up. Their
finding confirmed earlier evidence that people exhibit a higher degree of risk aversion
when the financial payoffs are larger (Binswanger, 1980; Bosch-Domènech and
Silvestre, 1999). For stated preference studies valuing uncertain environmental
outcomes, greater discounting of risk at larger scales could cause the related issues of
scope failure in contingent valuation and scale dependency in choice experiments.
However, it is unknown whether the same relationship holds in an environmental
context.
Our paper contributes to the growing literature on preferences for
environmental risk and how they compare to preferences for financial risk. Research
using both choice experiment data (Bartczak et al., 2016; Faccioli et al., 2019; Holzer
and McConnell, 2017) and adapted lottery menus (Bartczak et al., 2015; Riddel, 2012)
supports the general notion that people are averse to environmental risk. Parallels
between financial and environmental risk, however, are not straightforward. For
example, prospect theory has shown that people exhibit probabilistic aversion to
financial risks by underweighting low probabilities and overweighting high
probabilities (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). In an environmental context, some
4

researchers have found a similarly-shaped probability weighting function (Bartczak et
al., 2015; Riddel, 2012), while others have found the inverse (Roberts et al., 2008).
We focus on whether the established positive relationship between financial risk
aversion and scale carries over to an environmental setting, since it has important
implications for stated preference research. We detail the implications below.
We contribute to the expansive scope literature by suggesting the interaction of
risk aversion with scale as a new explanation and subjecting a discrete choice
experiment to a rare between-sample scope test. Explanations for scope failure have
been explored extensively in the contingent valuation literature (see Lopes and
Kipperberg, n.d. for a complete review). Quickly diminishing marginal utility (Rollins
and Lyke, 1998) and the purchasing of moral satisfaction for a flat fee (Kahneman and
Knetsch, 1992) are among the most widely recognized explanations. To our
knowledge, only one study in the literature relates scope response to scale and
uncertainty, but it does not allow for risk aversion. Powe and Bateman (2004)
discovered that survey respondents perceive a lower provision probability when an
environmental program is proposed at a larger geographic scale, which attenuates
scope response. While scope failure has received much scrutiny in contingent
valuation, it has been largely ignored in the discrete choice literature. In fact, we know
of just one study subjecting a choice experiment to a between-sample (external) test
for scope response (Andersson et al., 2016), which is considered the standard in
contingent valuation (Arrow et al., 1993).
Finally, we contribute to the benefit transfer literature by testing whether
models that incorporate risk aversion can reduce between-scale transfer errors. Choice
5

experiments are attractive for benefit transfer, since their hedonic structure allows
extracting marginal values for individual attributes (Rolfe et al., 2015). However, if
marginal values are scale dependent, some sort of calibration is required to reduce the
likelihood of transfer errors (Bueren and Bennett, 2004; Rolfe et al., 2013). Because
risk aversion may contribute to scale dependency, we test the ability of a model
capturing risk averting behavior to reduce between-scale transfer errors compared to a
model assuming risk neutrality.
To explore these topics, we administer a split sample choice experiment with a
geographic scale treatment. We create two versions of the experiment, one framed at a
large watershed scale in Maine and the other at a smaller, embedded subwatershed
scale. We elicit preferences for expanding access to spawning habitat for endangered
Atlantic salmon by removing dams at the expense of hydropower capacity. We vary
the likelihood that salmon will reach the numbers expected by scientists, reflecting
uncertainty surrounding recovery efforts. We simulate feasible levels for the attributes
at both geographic scales using ecological models (Roy et al., 2018). Given that the
subwatershed is embedded within the watershed, we have a confounding of scope (the
amount of an attribute, or the magnitude of a change) with scale (the geographic range
over which the attribute or change extends). Henceforth we will use scope to describe
the theoretical property of willingness to pay that increases with the quantity of an
environmental good, and scale to indicate both the geographic extent and quantitative
range of an attribute (i.e., scope is satisfied when willingness to pay increases with
scale).

6

We model the choice experiment data at both scales using different
assumptions about risk aversion and test whether environmental risk aversion
increases with scale, and the implications for understanding the results of a scope test
and transferring benefits between scales. Our baseline model is a linear expected
utility specification, which implies risk neutrality. Then we allow the utility function
to exhibit concavity by specifying a constant relative risk aversion functional form and
estimating a risk aversion coefficient. Our final model allows for heterogeneous risk
attitudes self-reported by respondents in the questionnaire. We use the three model
results from both scale treatments to obtain welfare estimates for restoring Atlantic
salmon to the subwatershed and watershed. To answer our research questions, we
make comparisons between the relevant model parameters and welfare estimates at
both scales.
We find that respondents exhibit a higher degree of environmental risk
aversion at the larger scale. Using our nonlinear model, we estimate risk aversion
coefficients of 0.694 and 0.923 at the subwatershed and watershed scale, respectively.
Additionally, our model that incorporates self-reported risk attitudes indicates a
relatively small and statistically insignificant discount associated with risk aversion at
the subwatershed scale. At the watershed scale, however, the risk aversion discount
grows in magnitude and becomes statistically significant. We take this as strong
evidence that risk aversion and scale have the same relationship in the environmental
domain that has been established in the financial domain (Binswanger, 1980; BoschDomènech and Silvestre, 1999; Holt and Laury, 2002).

7

Turning to scope, we find that the magnitude of scope response varies with the
degree of risk aversion. Respondents who self-identify as highly risk averse fail an
external scope test (i.e., willingness to pay decreases with scale), while those
identifying as more tolerant to risks exhibit a strong between-sample scope response
(i.e., willingness to pay strictly increases with scale). Andersson et al. (2016)
administered a similar split-sample scope test in the context of valuing a statistical life,
using a choice experiment to understand preferences for varying levels of mortality
risk. They report evidence of scope failure. Our results suggest risk preference
interacting with scale may be contributing to the lack of scope in their study, which is
firmly in a risky context. In general, we offer the interaction of risk preferences and
scale as a novel consideration when using scope to evaluate the validity of a study.
Finally, we find a model that incorporates risk aversion eliminates betweenscale benefit transfer errors for a subsample of our respondents. A risk neutral model
produces scale-dependent implied prices, which result in significant between-scale
transfer errors. Welfare estimates for the risky attribute, Atlantic salmon, are about
twice as large using the subwatershed-derived parameters compared to the watershedderived parameters. By utilizing a choice model that captures risk averting behavior,
we eliminate between-scale transfer errors for a subsample of respondents who
perceive uncertainty beyond what is explicit in the survey. Transfer errors are reduced,
but not eliminated, for another subsample who view the survey as consequential.
Utilizing our full sample, the transfer errors increase when we apply the risk aversion
model. These mixed results suggest that people may have different preferences for risk
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that arises from different sources. Further research is needed to operationalize risk
preferences as a viable approach for improving benefit transfer.

2. Background and hypotheses

2.1 Scale dependency and uncertainty

First, we define scale in the context of this paper. We use scale to refer to both
the geographic and quantitative range of an attribute, which are linked by an
ecological production function. For example, carrying capacity is an increasing
function of habitat area. While it is possible to separate geographic and quantitative
scale, for example by altering population density, we ensure inseparability by carefully
defining each attribute.
When environmental economists have manipulated scale in a split sample
choice experiment, they find lower (higher) implied prices larger (smaller) scales. We
refer to this inverse relationship as scale dependency. Bueren and Bennett (2004)
conducted a choice experiment to value land and water degradation in Australia,
testing the effect of regional versus national framing. Holding population constant,
they find the magnitude of implied prices is larger at the smaller (regional) scale.
Rolfe et al. (2013) find marginal values for conservation are significantly lower for
larger geographic frames in the context of both the Great Barrier Reef and an
Australian river catchment. In contrast, Rolfe and Windle (2008) report no difference
between marginal values elicited at regional and state scales. However, they presented
9

attributes as percentages (i.e., the percentage of a region’s soil that will be allowed to
degrade). Converting percentages to the appropriate numeric quantities results in scale
dependency. Finally, Schaafsma and Brouwer (2013) also test the effect of a
geographic scale treatment, although the goal and design of their study differs
significantly from ours. Nonetheless, they report lower point estimates for implied
prices associated with broader geographic scales.
We build on this research by testing for scale dependency of an explicitly
uncertain ecosystem service attribute. The outcomes from environmental programs
described in stated preference surveys are subject to several real and perceived
uncertainties from a respondent’s perspective: environmental uncertainty, political
uncertainty, and modeling uncertainty. While some unknowns are truly ambiguous,
others may be approximated by probabilities. For example, we may know that a
particular restoration strategy has roughly a 50% success rate. Split-sample studies
show that failing to include relevant risk information in a valuation task alters
preferences, leading to incorrect welfare estimates (e.g., Lundhede et al., 2015;
Makriyannis et al., 2018; Roberts et al., 2008; Rolfe and Windle, 2015). At the same
time, there is an apparent relationship between uncertainty and scale.
Limited research indicates a direct relationship between environmental
outcome uncertainty and scale. In a contingent valuation survey, Powe and Bateman
(2004) discovered that respondents found restoration outcomes framed at larger scales
less realistic. We contribute to the nascent literature investigating environmental
uncertainty and scale by testing the following initial hypothesis.

10

H1: Marginal willingness to pay for an explicitly uncertain attribute is lower
(higher) at a larger (smaller) scale.

2.2 Environmental risk aversion and scale

The robust evidence of scale dependency reported above may result from
respondents discounting perceived or explicit outcome uncertainty to a higher degree
at larger scales. Behavioral evidence exists that people become more risk averse when
the scale of financial payoff is larger. In a classic set of laboratory experiments, Holt
and Laury (2002) elicited subjects’ baseline risk preferences through their preferences
for incentivized lotteries. Next, they repeated the experiment but with the lottery
payoffs scaled up by a factor of 90. At the higher payoff levels, subjects tended to
prefer safer lotteries (i.e., they were more risk averse). Their result confirmed earlier
findings from the lab (Bosch-Domènech and Silvestre, 1999) and in the field with
rural farmers in India (Binswanger, 1980). These findings, though, are all in the
context of financial risk.
Generally, research on risk preferences in an environmental context has found
that people are not neutral to environmental risk. For example, people exhibit aversion
to risky conservation outcomes (Faccioli et al., 2019) and random catch in recreational
angling (Holzer and McConnell, 2017). Related research investigates whether
preferences for financial lotteries are predictive of risky environmental choices.
Grijalva et al. (2011) found financial risk aversion to be associated with support for a
safe minimum standards approach to resource management, and Bartczak et al. (2016)
11

provide evidence of a latent variable driving both financial lottery and risky
endangered species conservation decisions. Finally, a few papers directly compare
financial lottery choices to choices in lotteries adapted to an environmental context,
noting similar risk preferences across the two domains (Bartczak et al., 2015; Riddel,
2012).
Our paper contributes to the environmental risk preference literature by testing
for a relationship between risk aversion and scale in an environmental context. In a
choice experiment eliciting bird conservation preferences, Lundhede et al. (2015)
found additional disutility from outcome uncertainty at the highest levels of
conservation. We build on this initial evidence of a positive environmental risk
aversion-scale relationship by conducting a split-sample test of the following
hypothesis.
H2: Choice experiment respondents exhibit a higher degree of risk aversion at
a larger scale.
In the next two subsections we describe implications of scale-dependent marginal
willingness to pay, and what we might learn by considering the environmental risk
aversion-scale relationship.

2.3 Implications for benefit transfer

Scale-dependent implied prices can be a source of benefit transfer errors.
Benefit transfer is the process of taking valuation estimates derived from a primary
study or studies and applying them to a target site for which primary valuation data is
12

unavailable (Johnston et al., 2015). There has been a general trend toward using metaanalysis-type benefit transfer functions, but empirical evidence for the reliability of
this approach is mixed (Johnston and Rosenberger, 2010). Extracting a marginal value
for an individual attribute from a primary study and applying it to a target site remains
an attractive option (Rolfe et al., 2015). However, scale dependency implies that a
scale mismatch between policy and target sites will result in transfer errors. In fact,
some of the split sample research described in section 2.1 focuses on calibration
techniques for the express purpose of reducing between-scale transfer errors (Bueren
and Bennett, 2004; Rolfe et al., 2013). But these calibration factors are formed on a
case study basis, and no systematic approach exists (Rolfe et al., 2015).
If scale dependency results, at least in part, from respondents’ aversion to
environmental risk (see Hypothesis 2) then modeling risk aversion may reduce scale
dependency. A reduction in scale dependency (i.e., convergence of implied prices
derives at different scales) would result in reduced between-scale transfer errors. We
state this as a hypothesis below.
H3: Modeling respondents’ risk aversion reduces between-scale transfer
errors.

2.4 Implications for scope response

Demand theory dictates that respondents should exhibit nondecreasing
willingness to pay for increasing amounts of an environmental good or service. In the
stated preference literature, demonstrating consistency with this property is known as
13

demonstrating scope. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Blue
Ribbon Panel identified scope as an important validity test for contingent valuation
studies (Arrow et al., 1993), and it is now considered a desirable property for stated
preference studies more generally (Johnston et al., 2017).
Countless contingent valuation studies have tested for scope, with mixed
results (Desvousges et al., 2012). However, subsequent research has shown that failure
of a statistical scope test does not necessarily negate the validity of a study. Indeed
there are several theoretically and behaviorally consistent explanations for a muted or
nonexistent scope response (see Lopes and Kipperberg, n.d. for a complete review).
Among the most widely recognized are quickly diminishing marginal utility (Rollins
and Lyke, 1998) and the purchasing of moral satisfaction for a flat fee, deemed the
‘warm glow effect’ (Kahneman and Knetsch, 1992). Of particular relevance to our
study, Powe and Bateman (2004) found that conditioning on perceived outcome
certainty improved scope test results.
In contrast to contingent valuation, scope has received scant attention in the
choice experiment literature. One possible reason is that choice experiments exhibit
internal, or within-sample scope response by design. A positive (negative) statistically
significant coefficient for an attribute that provides utility (disutility) indicates the
presence of internal scope. However, the inverse relationship between marginal values
and scale, what we call scale dependency, could imply external scope failure while
satisfying the internal measure. Demonstrating external, or between-sample, scope has
typically proven more difficult and is considered a more rigorous test (Arrow et al.,
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1993). We are aware of just one study that submits a choice experiment to an external
scope test, and it found evidence of scope failure (Andersson et al., 2016).
We contribute to the vast scope literature by testing a choice experiment for
external scope, and offering risk aversion as a novel contributor to scope response. If
respondents exhibit a higher degree of risk aversion at a larger scale (see Hypothesis
2), external scope response is attenuated compared to a situation where respondents
weigh risk consistently across scales. This comprises our fourth and final hypothesis.
H4: Risk aversion, and particularly its interaction with scale, is a determinant
of external scope response.

3. Study context and survey details

We place our study in the context of valuing ecosystem services from dam
removal. The mix of ecosystem services provided by a river are highly dependent on
the presence or absence of dams in the river system. Dams were built in America
mainly to harness the power of rivers to support industry and provide electricity, but
they can also provide flood control and flatwater recreation opportunities, among other
benefits. But these benefits come at the expense of different ecosystem services. For
example, the negative effect of dams on fish habitat is well-documented (e.g., Poff and
Hart, 2002) and there is increasing recognition for the general ecological benefits of
freely flowing rivers (Auerbach et al., 2014; Bednarek, 2001). While there has been a
marked increase in the number of purposeful dam removals in recent years (American
Rivers, 2018), removals remain rare relative to the number of existing dams. Given the
15

expected growth in river restoration by dam removal, it is important to understand
public preferences for the ecosystem service tradeoffs involved.

3.1 Study site and scale treatment

We set our study in the Penobscot watershed located in the state of Maine,
USA, which is suitable for a number of reasons. First, the ecosystem services provided
by rivers and dams in the Penobscot watershed are conducive to our research
questions. The main tradeoff, as identified in focus groups, is between hydropower
production and sea-run fish habitat. Hydropower production in Maine is significant. In
2018, nearly one third of net electricity production in the state came from hydropower
(United States EIA, 2019). However, the large dams that support hydropower
production have consequences for other ecosystem services.
Endangered Atlantic salmon are expected to be a key beneficiary from dam
removal in the Penobscot, but their recovery is uncertain. Dams block rivers,
prohibiting or limiting the movement of fish throughout the system. Our focus groups
identified Atlantic salmon as a particularly high-value species. Atlantic salmon are
diadromous, meaning they spawn in freshwater river systems, migrate to the ocean as
juveniles, and swim upstream to freshwater habitats to spawn subsequent generations.
Dams are considered a major reason for their declining numbers and current listing as
an endangered species (Limburg and Waldman, 2009). However, dams are not the
only pressure facing Atlantic salmon. Overfishing and climate change have also taken
their toll. Perhaps for these reasons, Atlantic salmon have proven a difficult species to
16

recover (Mills et al., 2013). Though bad for Atlantic salmon, our research design
requires this type of outcome uncertainty to utilize choice models that incorporate risk
preferences.
In addition, the size of the Penobscot watershed allows us to generate a
meaningful scale treatment. The Penobscot is an expansive HUC-04 watershed,
originating near the Canadian border and draining about one third of the surface area
of Maine (22,196 km2) into the Atlantic Ocean. The watershed is composed of five
HUC-08 subwatersheds. We chose the southernmost Lower Penobscot HUC-08 as the
second scale to create our treatment. We refer to the broader HUC-04 as simply the
‘watershed’ and the embedded HUC-08 as the ‘subwatershed’ (Figure 1). To ensure
that the scenarios are realistic and that the subwatershed levels are nested numerically
within the watershed levels, we generate a range of feasible attribute levels for each
scale. We describe the methods for generating the levels next.

3.2 Deriving feasible attribute levels at both scales

Following best practices for nonmarket valuation, we design attribute levels at
both geographic scales using ecological production functions (e.g., Boyd and
Krupnick, 2013). We use the New England Dams Database (https://ddcnedams.sr.unh.edu/) combined with hydropower capacity licensing data from the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC, 2019), hydrologic data (USGS,
2017), and fish passage and habitat suitability models (Roy et al., 2018) to derive
feasible attribute levels at subwatershed and watershed scales. There are 52 and 112
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dams in the subwatershed and watershed, respectively. Of these dams, 17 are licensed
to generate hydropower, 58 have a lake or pond reservoir, and 62 block historic
upstream habitat for Atlantic salmon. We followed the methods in Roy et al. (2018) to
measure upper and lower limits of attribute values based on hypothetical scenarios in
which all dams in the basin are either kept in current condition or completely removed.
While hydropower capacity is simply calculated as the cumulative sum of capacity
across all generating dams, Atlantic salmon carrying capacity requires a spatially
explicit ecological model that we describe below.
Population estimates for Atlantic salmon are based on available habitat extent,
quality, and accessibility data (Roy et al., 2018)

𝑆 = 𝑐 ∑ [ℎ𝑖 ∏ (𝑝𝑗 )]
𝑖∈𝑛𝑑

(1)

𝑗∈𝑛𝑑𝑖

where 𝑆 is annual Atlantic salmon spawning population capacity (number of fish); 𝑛𝑑
is the set of all dams, indexed by 𝑖; 𝑛𝑑𝑖 is the set of all dams downstream from and
including dam 𝑖, indexed by j; ℎ𝑖 is the functional habitat accessible above dam 𝑖
(km2); 𝑝𝑗 is the upstream and downstream product of probability of passage through
downriver dam 𝑗; and 𝑐 is the annual population carrying capacity (number of fish m-2
a-1). We determine the spatial distribution of functional habitat hi based on physical
surveys and historic accounts (Houston et al., 2007; Martin and Apse, 2011), and
estimate functional habitat quality based on environmental (Olivero and Anderson,
2008) and hydrologic (USGS, 2017) model data and suitability requirements
(Armstrong et al., 2003; NOAA, 2009)
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ℎ𝑖 = ∑ [𝑎𝑟 𝑡𝑟 𝑣𝑟 𝜗𝑟 ⋅ 0.8]

(2)

𝑟∈𝑔𝑖

where 𝑔𝑖 is the set of river reaches immediately above dam 𝑖, indexed by 𝑟, 𝑎𝑟 is the
mean annual wetted area within reach 𝑟 (m2), 𝑡𝑟 is the mean annual temperature factor
in reach 𝑟, 𝑣𝑟 is the mean annual velocity factor in reach 𝑟, 𝜗𝑟 is a binary value
identifying if the river reach 𝑟 is historically accessible to Atlantic salmon, and 0.8 is
included to assume that 20% of available surface area exists along the river banks and
is unsuitable for habitat use due to natural river height fluctuations. Locations with
seasonal drying or tidal effects are excluded from analysis to reflect species’ long-term
intolerance of these conditions for spawning and rearing (Armstrong et al., 2003;
NOAA, 2009).

3.3 Survey details

The survey included four sections. The first section had questions about
recreational usage and quality perceptions of rivers in the watershed or subwatershed.
Next was an information section describing how dams impact fish populations and
alter recreational opportunities in general, followed by a description of the current
situation in the Penobscot. This page differed by scale treatment, showing the current
situation in either the watershed or subwatershed. The next section included the choice
tasks preceded by a consequentiality statement. The survey concluded with a selfreported measure of risk aversion, questions designed to assess consequentiality and
identify protest responses, and a set of standard sociodemographic questions.
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Each respondent faced a total of six choice questions. We defined attribute
levels based on the feasible range at each of the two scales (Table 1). We used those
levels to created a D-efficient design, eliminating the need for a large number of
choice sets (Rose and Bliemer, 2009). At each scale we created twelve choice sets
broken into two blocks. Each choice set consisted of three alternatives: the status quo
and two alternative management plans involving a different set of hypothetical dam
removals delivering different levels of each ecosystem service. Figure 2 shows an
example choice set. The watershed and subwatershed choice sets follow exactly the
same experimental design, differing only in the levels.

3.4 Implementation and sample statistics

We opted for a mail survey based on reports of low broadband penetration in
the study area. We sampled the names and addresses of 1,650 residents of the
subwatershed from a mailing list purchased from the marketing firm infoUSA®,
randomly assigning half to receive the watershed treatment and half to receive the
subwatershed treatment. Thus, the sample frame is held constant between treatments.
We used five points of contact via postal mail (Dillman et al., 2014), collecting data
between September and November of 2018. Out of 1,310 deliverable surveys we
received 448 that were at least partially completed, for a response rate of 34%. We
dropped individuals who chose the Status Quo alternative in all six choice questions
and indicated their reason for doing so as either disagreement with the payment
vehicle or a belief that they should not be asked to pay for damage they did not cause
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(Strazzera et al., 2003). Eliminating these protest responses along with unanswered
questions left us with 2,286 choices made by 389 individuals. Randomization
appeared to work. Responses were split approximately evenly between the two scale
treatments and demographics are similar across treatments (Table 2).

4. Methodology

4.1 Empirical models

We model our data using three different utility specifications, each making a
different assumption about risk preferences (Table 3). Our baseline model is a
nonlinear expected utility function that assumes risk neutrality. The next model
introduces risk aversion by allowing the expected utility function to exhibit concavity.
And our final model incorporates a self-reported measure of risk aversion that allows
us to separate risk aversion from diminishing marginal utility. We describe each model
in more detail below.
Many choice experiment studies incorporating explicit risk or uncertainty have
included an expected utility model, either as their main model (Faccioli et al., 2019;
Makriyannis et al., 2018) or as a baseline for comparison (Glenk and Colombo, 2013;
Lundhede et al., 2015; Roberts et al., 2008). We do the latter, assuming the standard
random utility framework and setting 𝑣𝑖 , the observable portion of utility from
alternative 𝑖, as a linear function of the attributes. We refer to this as our baseline, or
linear expected utility (LEU) model.
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𝑣𝑖 = 𝛽𝑆𝑄 + 𝛽𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑚 𝜋𝑖 𝑥𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑚 𝑖 + 𝛽ℎ𝑦𝑑 𝑥ℎ𝑦𝑑 𝑖 + 𝛽ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑥ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑖 + 𝛽𝑙𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝑥𝑙𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝑖 +
𝛽𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑥𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑖

(3)

In this LEU model, we assume survey respondents make an expected utility
calculation, multiplying the number of salmon that can be supported (𝑥𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑚 ) by the
probability that salmon will reach that number (𝜋). Inherent in this specification is that
respondents are risk neutral. In order to easily identify the differences in subsequent
models, we drop the 𝑖 subscripts and collapse the remaining 𝑘 attributes into a
summation, so that equation (3) becomes the following.
𝑣 = 𝛽𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑚 𝜋𝑥𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑚 + ∑𝑘 𝛽𝑘 𝑥𝑘

(4)

Our second specification is a nonlinear expected utility (NLEU) model, which
introduces a form of risk aversion that is confounded with diminishing marginal
utility. We specify the following, which is similar to others used in choice experiments
(Glenk and Colombo, 2013; Holzer and McConnell, 2017) but with a slightly simpler
functional form.
𝑣 = 𝜋𝑥𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑚 1−𝑟 + ∑𝑘 𝛽𝑘 𝑥𝑘

(5)

In model (5) we estimate 𝑟, the coefficient of relative risk aversion, with 0 < 𝑟 < 1
implying both risk aversion and diminishing marginal utility. Their inseparability
arises from Jensen’s Inequality (i.e., 𝑢′ > 0, 𝑢′′ < 0 ⇒ 𝑢(𝐸[𝑥]) > 𝐸[𝑢(𝑥)]). If
diminishing marginal utility is a source of scale dependency, the NLEU model may be
useful to reduce it. At the same time, if we wish to analyze risk aversion itself as it
relates to scale dependency, model (5) is insufficient.
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One option to separate risk aversion from diminishing marginal utility is to
incorporate nonlinear probability weighting, an element of prospect theory (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979).
There is some evidence that people exhibit the familiar S-shaped weighting curve in
environmental risk settings, although the degree of weighting varies with context
(Bartczak et al., 2015; Glenk and Colombo, 2013; Riddel, 2012; Roberts et al., 2008).
Probabilistic risk aversion is attractive for behavioral reasons and the fact that it is
separable from diminishing marginal utility, but the welfare implications are unclear
(Holzer and McConnell, 2017). For this reason we consider an alternative.
To consider risk aversion separately from the shape of our utility function, we
use a context free self-reported measure developed by Dohmen (2011) and shown to
correlate with traditional experimental elicitations (Naranjo et al., 2019). We asked
survey respondents the following question: “How do you see yourself? Are you
generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking
risks?” Then we asked them to choose a number between 0 (“not at all willing to take
risks”) and 10 (“very willing to take risks”). To improve statistical power and
improve interpretation, we collapse and recode into a self-reported risk measure 𝑅𝑆𝑅 ,
which can take a value of 0 (least risk averse), 1, or 2 (most risk averse). For our final
utility specification we return to our baseline linear utility model but include 𝑅𝑆𝑅 as an
interaction term. We refer to this as our self-reported risk aversion (SRRA) model.
𝑣 = 𝛽𝑠 𝜋𝑥𝑠 + 𝛽𝑆𝑅 𝑅𝑆𝑅 𝜋𝑥𝑠 + ∑𝑘 𝛽𝑘 𝑥𝑘
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(6)

In equation (6), 𝛽𝑆𝑅 estimates the utility discount associated with increasing levels of
risk aversion. This is similar to the setup used by Petrolia (2016) to model preferences
for risky seafood. We summarize the three models in Table 3.

4.2 Estimation details and hypothesis tests

We split the data by scale treatment and estimate the LEU, NLEU, and SRRA
specifications using mixed (random parameter) logit to account for the panel structure
of the data and allow for individual taste heterogeneity. We specify all parameters as
following normal distributions, except for 𝛽𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 , which we specify as fixed. We use
the six resulting sets of parameter estimates (three models estimated using data from
each of the two scale treatments) in subsequent welfare analyses. Our hypothesis tests
consist of comparing parameters and welfare estimates between models and scales.
We consider the change in welfare from two restoration scenarios: fully
restoring Atlantic salmon habitat in the subwatershed and fully restoring Atlantic
salmon habitat in the watershed, while holding the levels of all other attributes
constant. Following Hanemann (1984), we calculate an average welfare change as
follows:
CS = − 𝛽

1

𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡

[ln ∑𝑛 exp 𝑣𝑛1 − ln ∑𝑛 exp 𝑣𝑛0 ]

(7)

where CS is the compensating surplus welfare measure and 𝑣𝑛0 and 𝑣𝑛1 are the 𝑛th
residents’ indirect utility before and after restoration, respectively. We construct 95%
confidence intervals using the Krinsky and Robb (1986) technique.
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Hypothesis 1 is a test for scale dependency, or a difference in implied prices by
scale treatment. We expect the subwatershed treatment (𝑆𝑈𝐵) to yield higher marginal
WTP for Atlantic salmon restoration compared to the watershed treatment (𝑊𝑆).
H1:

𝑚𝑊𝑇𝑃 𝑆𝑈𝐵 > 𝑚𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑊𝑆

Hypothesis 2 tests whether risk aversion is stronger at the watershed scale than
at the subwatershed scale. For this we turn to coefficients from the two models that
incorporate risk aversion, NLEU and SRRA. For the NLEU model we can compare
values of 𝑟, the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk aversion, with a higher value
indicating a higher degree of risk aversion. For the SRRA model, we can compare
estimates of 𝛽𝑆𝑅 , the marginal disutility associated with individuals who self-report
higher risk aversion.
H2:

𝑊𝑆
𝑆𝑈𝐵
𝑟 𝑊𝑆 > 𝑟 𝑆𝑈𝐵 and 𝛽𝑆𝑅
> 𝛽𝑆𝑅

Hypothesis 3 tests whether models that incorporate risk aversion can reduce
scale dependency in order to reduce transfer errors. Support for Hypothesis 1 suggests
the risk neutral (LEU) model results in between-scale transfer errors. Here we test
whether a risk aversion model (NLEU) can address that problem. Transfer errors are
eliminated if the welfare estimate for restoring salmon habitat throughout the
subwatershed does not differ by scale treatment.1
H3:

𝑊𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒(𝑆𝑈𝐵)𝑆𝑈𝐵 = 𝑊𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒(𝑆𝑈𝐵)𝑊𝑆

Hypothesis 4 tests whether risk aversion becoming more important at the larger
scale (Hypothesis 2) contributes to scope response. Since the subwatershed is

1

We do not attempt to transfer welfare estimates in the other direction (i.e., from the
subwatershed to the watershed), since the watershed levels are outside the range elicited in the
subwatershed treatment.
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embedded geographically within the watershed, and the respective quantities of
Atlantic salmon are numerically embedded, the value of restoring salmon should be
non-declining as we increase the restoration scale from subwatershed to watershed.
We define scope response as the ratio of watershed (𝑊𝑆) to subwatershed (𝑆𝑈𝐵)
welfare estimates (𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑃𝐸 = 𝑊𝑆/𝑆𝑈𝐵) and characterize the results as follows:
𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑃𝐸 > 1 indicates ‘strong’ scope; 𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑃𝐸 = 1 indicates ‘weak’ scope; and
𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑃𝐸 < 1 indicates scope ‘failure’. Since we wish to investigate risk aversion as a
determinant of scope response separate from diminishing marginal utility, we avoid
the nonlinear model (NLEU) and focus on our self-reported measure (SRRA). Using
the SRRA model we calculate 𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑃𝐸 with the three possible values of self-reported
risk aversion (𝑅𝑆𝑅 = 0, 1, or 2), where 2 indicates those with the highest degree of risk
aversion. If risk aversion attenuates scope response, we would expect the following
pattern.
H4:

𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑃𝐸(𝑅𝑆𝑅 = 0) > 𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑃𝐸(𝑅𝑆𝑅 = 1) > 𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑃𝐸(𝑅𝑆𝑅 = 2)

5. Results

We report estimated means and standard deviations for the random parameters
and point estimates for the cost parameter from the three utility specifications at each
of the two scale treatments (Table 4). All coefficients are in the expected direction and
with one exception, all are significant with at least 90% confidence. In general,
respondents prefer some new dam management plan to maintaining the status quo.
They prefer plans that deliver more habitat for Atlantic salmon and river herring,
while not sacrificing hydropower capacity or lakefront shoreline. The SRRA model
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performs best and NLEU performs worst in terms of log likelihood, AIC, and
Mcfadden’s pseudo R2 at both scales.
We note a few general points of comparison between scale treatments. First,
scale treatment differences are attribute-specific. For example, marginal utility of
income (i.e., the cost parameter) and the marginal utility of hydropower are virtually
unaffected by scale the treatment. Point estimates of marginal utility for all other
attributes are of greater magnitude at the subwatershed scale. The coefficients for fish
(i.e., Atlantic salmon and herring) are about twice as large at the subwatershed scale,
while the coefficient for lake shoreline is about six times as large at that scale. Since
the cost parameter is consistent, implied prices follow the same pattern.
In general, there is greater preference heterogeneity at the watershed treatment,
evidenced by the standard deviation estimates. Both risk aversion models exhibit
statistically significant deviation around the mean only at the watershed scale,
providing an initial indication that risk preferences differ by scale. The nonlinear
model (NLEU) yields standard deviation estimates for nearly all parameters that are
smaller in magnitude than the other two models. Finally, the standard deviation of
salmon decreases when we allow marginal utility to vary by degree of self-reported
risk aversion (SRRA). Next we report the results of each hypothesis test.

5.1 Scale dependency

We find support for Hypothesis 1, that implied prices for an explicitly
uncertain attribute exhibit scale dependency when we assume risk neutrality. Using
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the LEU model results (Table 4) we calculate marginal WTP for habitat restoration to
support Atlantic salmon and construct 95% confidence intervals using Krinsky and
Robb (1986) technique. The subwatershed treatment yields an average implied price
of 24.59 (21.47 – 27.81) USD per person per year. With the watershed treatment, the
average implied price of salmon drops to 9.55 (8.68 – 10.52) USD per person
annually.

5.2 Environmental risk aversion and scale

We find support for Hypothesis 2, that people are more averse to
environmental risk at the larger scale. First, comparing point estimates for the
coefficients of relative risk aversion (𝑟 in our NLEU model) we found 0.923 and 0.694
at the watershed and subwatershed scales, respectively (Table 4). The higher value of
𝑟 indicates a larger degree of environmental risk aversion at the watershed scale.
However, since 𝑟 simultaneously determines concavity of the utility function, the
higher value also indicates that marginal utility diminishes more quickly at the
watershed scale. Additional evidence, unconfounded with diminishing marginal
utility, comes from looking at the adjustments to marginal utility associated with a
higher degree of self-reported risk aversion (𝛽𝑆𝑅 in our SRRA model). At the
subwatershed scale, 𝛽𝑆𝑅 is -0.036 and not statistically significant. In contrast, 𝛽𝑆𝑅 is
greater in magnitude (-0.052) and 95% statistically significant at the watershed scale.
Taken together, these results suggest a direct relationship between environmental risk
aversion and scale.
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5.3 Benefit transfer

We find limited support for Hypothesis 3, which tests the ability of a nonlinear
risk aversion model (NLEU) to reduce between-scale transfer errors. We calculate the
errors associated with applying parameters derived from the watershed scale treatment
to value restoring salmon to the subwatershed (Table 5). To explore the effect of
heterogeneous risk preferences, we present the results using two subsamples in
addition to our full sample. Of 389 total respondents in our full sample, 203 indicated
disagreement with the following statement:“If one of the particular projects is chosen,
the benefits will be delivered in the amounts predicted”. The second subsample is
composed of the 237 individuals who expressed agreement with the following
consequentiality statement: “The results of this survey will influence management of
the Penobscot Watershed.” Both groups perceive some additional source of
uncertainty beyond what is explicit in the survey which influence their risk preference
(e.g., distrust of scientific modeling or political uncertainty). Full mixed logit results
for the two subsamples are in Tables 6 and 7.
The linear model (LEU) consistently underestimates benefits when the
watershed treatment is applied to value subwatershed restoration. Using the full
sample, the average value of restoring salmon to the subwatershed derived from the
linear model is $179.41. Using the watershed parameters, the welfare estimate for the
same restoration is $69.76, an underestimation of 61.1%. The linear model yields
similar results for the two subsamples. The watershed treatment underestimates the
value of subwatershed restoration by 57.2% for the uncertainty subsample and 66.5%
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for the consequentiality subsample. These results from the linear model are as
expected, given the scale dependency of marginal WTP (Hypothesis 1).
The nonlinear risk aversion model (NLEU) reduces transfer errors compared to
the linear model (LEU) for the two subsamples, but not the full sample. For the
subsample perceiving additional uncertainty, the underestimation of benefits from the
watershed treatment is reduced to 21.1%. Further, the estimates generated by the
watershed and subwatershed treatments for this subsample are statistically identical,
indicating that the NLEU model effectively eliminated transfer errors for this
subsample. For the consequentiality subsample the reduction in error is more modest
(48.8%), and the magnitude of error increases (81.6%) when the full sample is
utilized.

5.4 Scope response

We find evidence supporting Hypothesis 4, that risk aversion becoming more
important at the larger scale (Hypothesis 2) attenuates scope response. In the previous
section we focused on welfare estimates for restoring salmon to the subwatershed.
Now we introduce a second scenario: restoring salmon to the entire watershed. We
perform our external (between-sample) scope test by comparing the subwatershed
welfare derived from the subwatershed treatment to the watershed welfare derived
from the watershed treatment. We present baseline results using the linear model
(LEU) and look for the effect of risk aversion using the self-reported measure (SRRA)
to avoid confounding with diminishing marginal utility (Figure 3).
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Baseline analysis using our risk neutral (LEU) model suggests the presence of
weak scope. Point estimates for the average value of restoring salmon to the
subwatershed and watershed are $179.41 and $203.47, respectively. However, since
the estimates are not statistically different, we conclude that welfare is not strictly
increasing with the scale of restoration. Hence our baseline characterization of weak
scope.
Results from the self-reported risk aversion (SRRA) model suggest that the
assumption of risk neutrality in our baseline (LEU) analysis masks some
heterogeneity. When 𝑅𝑆𝑅 = 0, the subwatershed and watershed restorations are valued
at $219.83 and $328.48 respectively, using the appropriate model scale parameters.
These estimates are statistically different, indicating that people reporting the least
amount of risk aversion exhibit a strong external scope response. When 𝑅𝑆𝑅 = 1 we
see nearly identical estimates for restoring the subwatershed and watershed, evidence
of weak scope. And finally, for people reporting the highest degree of risk aversion
(𝑅𝑆𝑅 = 2), we see external scope failure. For these individuals, the watershed
restoration is valued at $134.15, but the greater aversion to risk at the larger scale
drives the value of watershed restoration down to a statistically different $24.73.

6. Discussion

Our baseline results demonstrating scale dependency are consistent with prior
split-sample choice experiments finding lower implied prices associated with broader
scales (Bueren and Bennett, 2004; Rolfe et al., 2013; Rolfe and Windle, 2008;
Schaafsma and Brouwer, 2013). We show that the scale effect extends to an ecosystem
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service described with explicit uncertainty. Some studies have attempted to calculate
calibration factors, which would allow value estimates derived at one scale to be easily
transferred to a different scale (Bueren and Bennett, 2004; Rolfe et al., 2013). Our
results introduce a couple of complications to this approach. First, scale dependency
was not constant across all the attributes in our choice experiment. The implied prices
for additional hydropower capacity, for example, were mostly consistent between
scale treatments. In contrast, implied prices for fish and lake shoreline exhibited
varying degrees of scale dependency. One possibility is that respondents perceived the
projections of hydropower capacity with greater certainty compared to the other
attributes (Lundhede et al., 2015), despite that we only explicitly associated
uncertainty with Atlantic salmon. Implementing a scale-calibration approach to benefit
transfer (Rolfe et al., 2015) may require calculating different factors for certain and
uncertain attributes.
Further complicating the scale issue for uncertain attributes, our results show
that a risk aversion model reduced transfer errors only for subsets of respondents who
perceived different levels and potential sources of uncertainty. In particular, the
nonlinear utility concept of risk aversion captured by our NLEU model eliminated
scale dependency for individuals who perceived additional uncertainty beyond what
was explicit in the survey. This highlights the importance of controlling for prior, or
perceived uncertainty (Lundhede et al., 2015). It also suggests that respondents may
have different risk preferences for different sources of uncertainty. The uncertainty we
describe explicitly in the survey pertains strictly to environmental sources—salmon
restoration is subject to several environmental pressures that cannot be predicted with
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certainty. The additional uncertainty perceived by some respondents could be political
uncertainty, modeling uncertainty, or something else altogether. Even if risk
preferences are consistent, they may interact with scale in unique ways depending on
the source.
We find strong evidence that environmental risk aversion in general has a
direct relationship with scale. A growing literature studies risk preferences specifically
in an environmental context, finding consistent evidence that people are averse to
environmental risk (e.g., Bartczak et al., 2015; Faccioli et al., 2019; Riddel, 2012).
Beyond that, little is known aside from the fact that welfare estimates are sensitive to
different modeling treatments of risk aversion (Glenk and Colombo, 2013). We
showed that the risk aversion-scale relationship known to exist in the financial domain
(Binswanger, 1980; Bosch-Domènech and Silvestre, 1999; Holt and Laury, 2002)
applies in an environmental context. Next we discuss how our result contributes to the
ongoing scope debate.
Environmental risk aversion increasing with scale is a novel consideration for
interpreting scope tests. To our knowledge, only one other choice experiment study
performs a split sample test for external scope (Andersson et al., 2016). They find the
value of a statistical life is sensitive to the magnitude of mortality reduction presented
to survey respondents, which they interpret as scope failure indicating theoretical
inconsistency. Our results, however, suggest that the scope failure may result from a
positive risk aversion-scale relationship, an accepted behavioral finding for financial
contexts. More generally, we contribute to the large body of work exploring potential
explanations for a modest or nonexistent scope response (e.g., Carson and Mitchell,
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1995; Desvousges et al., 2012; Whitehead, 2016). Our work is particularly close to
that of Powe and Bateman (2004), who show in a contingent valuation setting that
scope can be attenuated by the perception that larger environmental programs are
riskier.

7. Conclusion

We administered a choice experiment with a split sample scale treatment in
order to study environmental risk aversion and potential implications for nonmarket
valuation. We set our study in the context of dam removals to restore endangered
Atlantic salmon habitat at the expense of hydropower capacity. We vary the likelihood
that salmon will reach the number expected by scientists, reflecting uncertainty
surrounding Atlantic salmon recovery efforts. We create two versions of the survey,
one framed at the Penobscot watershed scale and the other framed at an embedded
subwatershed scale. Holding the sample frame constant, we randomly assign subjects
to receive one of the two scale treatments. We report mixed logit results derived from
each scale treatment using three different utility specifications. Our baseline analysis
utilizes a linear expected utility function, which inherently assumes risk neutrality.
The remaining two models make different assumptions about the origin of risk
aversion. The first is a nonlinear expected utility model that assumes risk aversion
arises solely from concave utility, while the second treats risk aversion as an inherent
human trait that respondents self-report in the survey.
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Our results show that people are more averse to larger-scale environmental
risks, which attenuates scope response. Both models that incorporate risk aversion
indicate people discount risk more heavily at the larger scale, a behavioral finding that
has already been established for financial risks (Holt and Laury, 2002). Focusing on
the implications for scope, we find that the baseline risk neutral model masks a
heterogeneous scope response. Our self-reported risk aversion model results show that
people reporting the lowest degree of risk aversion exhibit a strong scope response
while those reporting the highest degree of risk aversion exhibit scope failure. In the
only comparable split-sample test for external scope using a choice experiment,
Andersson et al. (2016) report scope failure. Our results suggest that they may be
reporting a false negative by failing to incorporate risk preferences. In general, we
suggest the risk aversion-scale relationship as a novel factor for understanding scope
response.
Additionally, we find that the implied prices for salmon, but not hydropower,
depend on the scale at which they are elicited. Marginal values, therefore, cannot
simply be calibrated to different scales using a common adjustment factor. This poses
a problem for benefit transfer approaches that rely on harvesting implied prices from
choice experiments (Rolfe et al., 2015). We found that a risk aversion model could
successfully eliminate scale dependency, negating the need for scale calibration, for a
subset of our respondents who perceived additional sources of uncertainty. We think
an important area for future research is to isolate risk preferences for the various
sources and types of environmental uncertainty.
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We conclude with a few general implications for stated preference research.
Namely, it seems prudent to include a simple self-assessed risk preference elicitation
alongside other debriefing questions. The cognitive burden to the respondent is low,
and it may be helpful to demonstrate scope responsiveness. In addition, collecting
even coarse risk preference data could prove beneficial for future benefit transfer
research given the relationship between risk preferences and scale. While our research
shows a limited ability for risk aversion models to reduce transfer errors, risk
preference data could potentially be a useful input into meta-analysis benefit transfer
functions. More research is required to validate the utility of this method, however, the
research cannot be performed until enough primary studies have collected risk
preference data.
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Figure 1. Geographic scale treatment

42

Figure 2. Sample choice set from the subwatershed treatment
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Baseline
Low
Medium
High
(LEU) Level of self-reported risk aversion (SRRA)
Figure 3. External scope test results by level of self-reported risk aversion
Notes: Welfare estimates are for restoring Atlantic salmon habitat to the subwatershed and watershed.
Levels of other attributes are held constant. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals constructed
using Krinsky and Robb procedure with 5,000 draws.
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Table 1. Attribute levels for both scale treatments
Levels
Attribute Name

Subwatershed

Watershed

700 2500 5000 8000

1500 7000 14000 22000

ATLANTIC SALMON
number that can be supported

LIKELIHOOD
25% 50% 75% 90%

that salmon utilize new habitat

HYDROPOWER
thousands of homes powered

10 30 50 70

45 90 155 185

1 3 6 9

2 5 10 16

0 15 30 50

0 150 300 500

RIVER HERRING
millions that can be supported

LAKE SHORELINE
miles lost

ANNUAL COST
property tax surcharge

$0 $50 $95 $150 $250 $400

Note: Status quo levels are in bold.
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Table 2. Demographic distributions by scale treatment

Gender

Age

Household
Income
(thousands)

Subwatershed
Treatment
49.2

Watershed
Treatment
49.5

Female

50.3

50.5

18-34

14.7

15.7

35-49

13.2

19.1

50-64

34.5

35.8

65+

37.6

29.4

< 50

41.8

38.2

50 - 99

32.9

35.5

100 - 149

16.5

17.2

150-199

7.1

4.8

200+

1.7

4.3

191

198

Male

Number of respondents

46

47

Risk aversion confounded
with diminishing marginal
utility

Risk aversion as an inherent
context-free trait

Self-reported Risk Aversion
(SRRA)

Risk neutrality

Linear Expected Utility
(LEU)

Nonlinear Expected Utility
(NLEU)

Risk Preference Assumption

Name

Table 3. Utility specification
Model

Table 4. Mixed logit results
LEU

Subwatershed
NLEU

SRRA

LEU

Watershed
NLEU

SRRA

Mean

𝛽𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑜𝑛

0.154***

0.186***

0.069***

0.112***

(0.042)

(0.058)

(0.020)

(0.029)

𝑟
𝛽𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘
𝛽𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑄

𝛽
𝛽
𝛽

0.694***

0.923***

(0.081)

(0.108)

𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒

𝑜

𝑦𝑑𝑟𝑜

𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔

𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑠

-0.036

-0.052**

(0.044)

(0.025)

-2.327***

-0.769***

-1.900***

-1.683***

-1.315***

-1.858***

(0.400)

(0.253)

(0.409)

(0.322)

(0.231)

(0.326)

0.013***

0.010***

0.013***

0.011***

0.006***

0.011***

(0.003)

(0.002)

(0.003)

(0.002)

(0.001)

(0.002)

0.071***

0.062***

0.073***

0.028*

0.027**

0.028*

(0.021)

(0.020)

(0.021)

(0.016)

(0.010)

(0.016)

-1.823***

-1.593***

-1.867***

-0.314***

-0.190***

-0.316***

(0.472)

(0.368)

(0.455)

(0.062)

(0.032)

(0.067)

Standard deviation

𝛽𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑜𝑛

0.154*

0.039

0.143***

0.098**

(0.088)

(0.196)

(0.037)

(0.045)

𝑟
𝛽𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘

𝛽𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑄
𝛽
𝛽
𝛽

0.114

0.409***

(0.112)

(0.087)

𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒

𝑜

𝑦𝑑𝑟𝑜

𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔

𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑠

3.680***

1.867***

0.069

0.075**

(0.085)

(0.036)

4.683***

2.911***

1.607***

2.915***

(0.361)

(0.256)

(0.573)

(0.361)

(0.173)

(0.364)

0.011**

0.000

0.013***

0.014***

0.008***

0.014***

(0.005)

(0.007)

(0.005)

(0.002)

(0.001)

(0.002)

0.029

0.001

0.013

0.105***

0.038***

0.101***

(0.034)

(0.033)

(0.032)

(0.024)

(0.014)

(0.024)

2.535***

0.946**

2.316***

0.420***

0.143***

0.442***

(0.684)

(0.403)

(0.656)

(0.079)

(0.036)

(0.076)

Fixed parameters
𝛽

𝑜𝑠𝑡

N (obs./ind.)
LL
AIC
Pseudo R-sq

-0.006***

-0.006***

-0.006***

-0.007***

-0.006***

-0.007***

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.000)

(0.001)

1112/191
-763.55
1549.1
0.3750

1112/191
-912.90
1847.8
0.2527

1112/191
-749.69
1525.4
0.3863

1174/198
-886.85
1795.7
0.3124

1174/198
-957.76
1937.5
0.2574

1174/198
-879.85
1785.7
0.3178

Note: *,**,*** indicate significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level, respectively.
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Table 5. Transfer errors from applying watershed treatment results to value restoration
of Atlantic salmon habitat throughout the subwatershed
SAMPLE

Full sample
(N = 389)

Respondents
who perceive
additional
uncertainty
(N = 203)
Respondents
who perceive
survey
consequentiality
(N = 237)

Linear Expected Utility
(LEU)

TREATMENT
SUB
WS
179.41
69.76
(156.60; 203.59) (63.07; 76.90)

% ERROR
WS→SUB
-61.1%

Nonlinear Expected
Utility

180.30
33.24
(121.70; 247.78) (-13.30; 89.05)

-81.6%

MODEL

Linear Expected Utility
(LEU)

92.37
(62.48; 92.37)

39.50
(28.52; 51.11)

-57.2%

Nonlinear Expected
Utility

132.70
(89.96; 183.79)

104.74
(69.29; 143.91)

-21.1%

Linear Expected Utility
(LEU)

226.09
(194.95; 258.46)

75.82
(67.68; 85.53)

-66.5%

Nonlinear Expected
Utility

122.77
(88.25; 161.57)

62.89
(40.73; 87.01)

-48.8%

Notes: Welfare estimates are in USD per person per year. Levels of other attributes are held
constant. 95% confidence intervals are in parentheses calculated using Krinsky and Robb
procedure with 5,000 draws.

49

Table 6. Mixed logit results for subsample who perceived additional uncertainty
Subwatershed
LEU
NLEU

Watershed
LEU
NLEU
Mean

𝛽𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑜𝑛

0.102*

0.039*

(0.056)

(0.021)

𝑟

𝛽𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑄
𝛽

𝛽
𝛽

𝑜

𝑦𝑑𝑟𝑜

𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔

𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑠

0.776***

0.773***

(0.120)

(0.070)

-1.982***

-2.019***

-1.303***

-1.007**

(0.681)

(0.587)

(0.447)

(0.400)

0.017***

0.012***

0.006***

0.005***

(0.005)

(0.004)

(0.002)

(0.001)

0.057*

0.075**

0.013

0.015

(0.033)

(0.038)

(0.018)

(0.015)

-1.833**

-1.729***

-0.238***

-0.167***

(0.719)

(0.522)

(0.072)

(0.055)

Standard deviation
𝛽𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑜𝑛

0.025

0.059

(0.302)

(0.058)

𝑟
𝛽𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑄
𝛽

𝛽
𝛽

𝑜

𝑦𝑑𝑟𝑜

𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔

𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑠

0.266*

0.037

(0.150)

(0.110)

5.238***

3.031***

3.260***

2.753***

(0.880)

(0.579)

(0.493)

(0.436)

0.015**

0.008*

0.010***

0.001

(0.007)

(0.005)

(0.003)

(0.003)

0.032

0.026

0.051

0.015

(0.057)

(0.150)

(0.040)

(0.020)

2.506***

1.199*

0.353***

0.288***

(0.952)

(0.623)

(0.090)

(0.052)

Fixed parameters
𝛽

𝑜𝑠𝑡

N (obs./ind.)
LL
AIC
Pseudo R-sq

-0.008***

-0.006***

-0.007***

-0.007***

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

598/103
-360.18
742.4
0.4517

598/103
-474.43
970.9
0.3336

592/100
-433.27
888.5
0.3338

592/100
-464.24
950.5
0.2862

Note: *,**,*** indicate significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level, respectively.
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Table 7. Mixed logit results for subsample who perceived the survey as consequential
Subwatershed
LEU
NLEU

Watershed
LEU
NLEU
Mean

𝛽𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑜𝑛

0.160***

0.089***

(0.049)

(0.034)

𝑟

𝛽𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑄
𝛽

𝛽
𝛽

𝑜

𝑦𝑑𝑟𝑜

𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔

𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑠

0.776***

0.852***

(0.120)

(0.090)

-2.506***

-2.019***

-2.638***

-2.145***

(0.613)

(0.587)

(0.466)

(0.315)

0.010***

0.012***

0.017***

0.008***

(0.003)

(0.004)

(0.003)

(0.002)

0.085***

0.075**

0.032

0.012

(0.026)

(0.038)

(0.025)

(0.017)

-1.764***

-1.729***

-0.447***

-0.304***

(0.515)

(0.522)

(0.106)

(0.055)

Standard deviation
𝛽𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑜𝑛

0.093

0.215***

(0.166)

(0.056)

𝑟
𝛽𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑄
𝛽

𝛽
𝛽

𝑜

𝑦𝑑𝑟𝑜

𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔

𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑠

0.266*

0.565***

(0.150)

(0.083)

3.400***

3.031***

2.828***

1.584***

(0.361)

(0.579)

(0.469)

(0.253)

0.006

0.008*

0.020***

0.012***

(0.008)

(0.005)

(0.004)

(0.002)

0.004

0.026

0.151***

0.105***

(0.034)

(0.150)

(0.035)

(0.025)

1.664*

1.199*

0.680***

0.246***

(0.905)

(0.623)

(0.133)

(0.064)

Fixed parameters
𝛽

𝑜𝑠𝑡

N (obs./ind.)
LL
AIC
Pseudo R-sq

-0.005***

-0.006***

-0.009***

-0.007***

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

648/110
-451.51
925.0
0.3658

648/110
-474.43
970.9
0.3336

750/127
-551.31
1124.6
0.3309

750/127
-589.49
1201.0
0.2846

Note: *,**,*** indicate significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level, respectively.
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ABSTRACT

Environmental federalism studies the tradeoffs between centralized and
decentralized environmental policies. Ecological restoration is a large and growing
sector of the economy, but it is unstudied from an environmental federalism
perspective. The implications are important, because coordinating restoration projects
across larger geographies increases the efficiency of ecosystem service production.
We study the effects of decentralized decisions about dam removals, an increasingly
popular approach to river restoration. Specifically, we ask whether state border
proximity impacts the likelihood that a dam is chosen for removal. We constructed a
spatially explicit dataset of removed and existing dams in 13 northeastern states. We
use binary and continuous matching to improve covariate overlap, and we employ an
instrumental variable to address endogeneity. Our results suggest dams located
immediately upstream of a state border are about 7 percentage points more likely to be
removed than dams with no border downstream. The effect becomes stronger for dams
located farther upstream of a border. Each standard deviation of additional upstream
distance from a border increases removal likelihood by between 5.8 and 7.0
percentage points. The qualitative consistency of our estimates across models provides
evidence that states respond to individual incentives, suggesting efficiency gains from
larger scale coordination may go unrealized without formal cooperation.
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1. Introduction

Environmental federalism applies theories from fiscal federalism to
environmental policy. The central result is that local policies can better match the
tastes of local constituencies, but centralized policies increase efficiency by
internalizing any externalities (Besley and Coate, 2003; Oates, 1972). For example,
spillovers can cause underprovision or spatial misallocation of public goods when they
are provided by local governments (Bloch and Zenginobuz, 2007; Braid, 2010). Such
could be the case with certain ecosystem services, including most regulatory and
cultural services, which are public in nature (Costanza, 2008). Despite a large and
growing ecological restoration sector of the US economy (BenDor et al., 2015), the
environmental federalism consequences for ecosystem service provision are unstudied.
This study takes a first look at environmental federalism in an ecological
restoration context, examining whether states consider downstream border proximity
when selecting river reaches to restore by dam removal. Dam removal is gaining
popularity as an effective approach to restoring river ecosystem services (Bednarek,
2001). The productive efficiency benefits from centralizing dam removal decisions
through large scale (i.e., regional or basin) optimization are well-documented (Neeson
et al., 2015; Roy et al., 2018). In practice, however, dam removal decisions are
generally not coordinated across sites (Magilligan et al., 2016). We empirically test
whether state-level restoration outcomes are misaligned with broader optimization
efforts.
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Our application contributes to the empirical environmental federalism
literature, which has focused mainly on air and water quality (i.e., pollution and
abatement). In general, previous literature has confirmed the theoretical result that in
the presence of spillovers, decentralized policies lead to suboptimal outcomes.
Decentralization has been found to be associated with degraded water quality near
international (Sigman, 2002) and subnational (Lipscomb and Mobarak, 2017; Sigman,
2005) borders. Air and water pollution abatement are lower when out of state
constituencies receive the benefits (Gray and Shadbegian, 2004). Furthermore,
countries overexploit their water resources when the costs are borne by a downstream
neighbor (Olmstead and Sigman, 2015). Our research contributes to this strand of
literature in a novel setting—environmental restoration.
To test environmental federalism in dam removal decisions, we constructed a
spatially explicit dataset of all existing and removed dams in 13 states in the
northeastern US. Taking a quasi-experimental approach, we categorize dams upstream
of a state border as treated, and those with no state border downstream as controls.
Noting severe misbalance between the treated and control units, we preprocess the
data using covariate matching with treatment defined as binary (Ho et al., 2007) and
continuous (Fong et al., 2018). We create two matched datasets, one defining
treatment as distance to downstream border (continuous) and the other using presence
of a downstream border (binary). We model the determinants of dam removal on our
raw, binary, and continuously matched datasets, employing an instrumental variable to
address endogeneity from nonrandom siting of dams relative to state borders.
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We find consistent evidence that states respond to individual incentives when
choosing dam removal projects. Dam removals are more likely upstream of state
borders, and they become even more likely farther upstream. Our results indicate that
a dam located immediately upstream of a border is about 7 percentage points more
likely to be removed than a similar dam with no border downstream. Additionally,
dam removal likelihood increases by 0.5 percentage points for every 10 km of
downstream distance between the dam and a border. The consistency of our estimates
across matching methods suggests that choosing between continuous and
dichotomized matching is relatively unimportant for the purpose of data
preprocessing.

2. Background

The true number of dams in the US is unknown, but estimates range from
about 75,000 structures large enough to meet National Inventory of Dams criteria
(Graf, 1999) to over two million when smaller barriers are included (Smith et al.,
2002). Dams are physical barriers that alter the magnitude and timing of river flows to
serve a purpose: provide hydropower, flood control, water supply, navigation, or
recreation. But the needs of society are evolving, and the ecosystem service benefits
from free-flowing rivers are increasingly clear (Auerbach et al., 2014). Dam removal
has proven to be an effective tool for restoring some of these benefits, especially
recovering native fish species (Bednarek, 2001).
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To date there have been nearly 4,000 purposeful dam removals globally (Ding
et al., 2019), and over 1,400 in the US alone (American Rivers, 2018). Grabowski et
al. (2018) analyzed trends in dam removal and predicted that by 2050 the US will
remove between 4,000 and 36,000 dams. Since different dam removals will deliver
different levels of different ecosystem services (Poff and Hart, 2002), an important
question is which removal projects should receive priority (Doyle et al., 2003).
Dam removal budgets can be utilized most efficiently by coordinating across
larger spatial scales (Neeson et al., 2015; Roy et al., 2018), and researchers have
developed various models to optimize dam removal decisions. Some consider dams
simultaneously with culverts (Fitzpatrick and Neeson, 2018; Martin and Levine,
2017), while others optimize based on multiple ecosystem services (Roy et al., 2018).
Others attempt to incorporate hydrologic modelling to improve the accuracy of
predicted changes (Ishiyama et al., 2018) or economic costs to consider limited
budgets (Kraft et al., 2019; Neeson et al., 2015).
Despite the availability of increasingly sophisticated models, barriers remain to
a large- scale coordinated approach (Magilligan et al., 2016). For instance, wellplanned and high-value dam removal projects can fail on the basis of local opposition
(Fox et al., 2016). More recently, researchers have begun searching for solutions to the
issue of public opposition using participatory exercises (Diessner et al., 2020),
bargaining techniques (Weir et al., 2020), and multicriteria decision-making analysis
(Fox et al., 2019). However, implementation of these techniques in an actual decisionmaking context is still at its infancy. In this paper we take a step back to examine a
more fundamental barrier to coordination: strategic behavior by states.
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States have the ability to steer both internal and external funds toward favored
projects. American Rivers, a national non-profit organization and leading proponent of
dam removal, published a guide outlining the steps involved in a typical removal
project (Graber et al., 2015). Between feasibility studies, permitting, engineering, and
deconstruction, projects typically require between $50,000 and $500,000. Funding is
usually received from multiple sources. And while many major funding sources are
federal in scope (e.g., the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association), they favor
projects with demonstrated state-level support (Graber et al., 2015). States can
influence removals, but it is only inefficient if states prioritize projects differently than
stakeholders with a broader scope. In the next section we motivate why this might be
the case.

3. Environmental federalism and dam removal decisions

State-level incentives lead to dam removal decisions that may differ from
regional or basin-scale optimization efforts. The realized benefits of dam removal are
site-dependent, but functional network size (the number of barrier-free river miles up
and downstream of a dam) is a commonly used metric to compare potential removals.
When one dam is removed, the functional networks of adjacent dams increase. Those
dams become more attractive removal candidates, increasing the likelihood that they
will receive competitive external funds in the future. If we consider multiple time
periods, the spillover benefits from one dam removal can extend well beyond
immediately adjacent dams. If states wish to capture more external funds in the future
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for river restoration, they may favor projects located farther upstream of state borders.
This setting leads to the central hypothesis of this study:
The probability of dam removal increases with downstream distance to a state
border.
After carefully controlling for other important determinants of dam removal, empirical
evidence in favor of this hypothesis would be strong evidence for state-level
strategizing. Nevertheless, we firmly ground our hypothesis in the literature.
Fiscal federalism, the branch of public economics studying the appropriate
level of government to provide a service, provides a theoretical basis. In the case of
public good provision, a key finding is that the optimal extent of decentralization
depends on the extent of spillovers and constituent taste heterogeneity (Besley and
Coate, 2003; Oates, 1972). By assuming away taste heterogeneity, studies have arrived
at interesting results from a game theory perspective. In the presence of spillovers,
equilibrium provision locations and levels differ from the social optimum (Bloch and
Zenginobuz, 2007; Braid, 2010). In an environmental context, empirical evidence of
fiscal federalism inefficiencies are collected in a strand of literature known as
environmental federalism.
Our study examines the consequences of environmental federalism for
hydrological ecosystem restoration. To date, the literature has focused mainly on air
and water pollution. The strongest results are demonstrated along rivers, where
directional flow is straightforward to model. For instance, Gray and Shadbegian
(2004) found that net pollution was higher downstream of pulp and paper mills located
upstream of state borders. Another series of studies found similar results for general
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water pollution near state (Sigman, 2005) and international (Sigman, 2002) borders.
Lipscomb and Mobarak (2017) exploit changing county boundaries in Brazil to
implement a quasi-experimental design, finding that water quality deteriorates with
border proximity. In a slight variation on the theme, Olmstead and Sigman (2015)
show that countries tend to overexploit their water resources when the costs are borne
by a downstream country. Specifically, countries are more likely to site large dams
upstream of international borders. In contrast, we study the effect of borders on dam
removals. Thus, we contribute to the overall literature by providing empirical evidence
of strategic behavior by states in an unexplored setting, i.e., ecosystem restoration.
We note that in addition to our border proximity hypothesis, we address a
related but distinct question: whether or not dam removal is more likely upstream of a
state border regardless of proximity. If removal costs or risks are concentrated
downstream, such as when a dam removal releases contaminated sediment or
excessive nutrients (Gold et al., 2016), removals may be more likely if the costs will
eventually be passed to a downstream neighbor. However, given the site specificity of
removal outcomes (Poff and Hart, 2002), the expected result is ambiguous.

4. Data

We constructed a database of existing and removed dams in 13 northeastern
US states. We started with a list of existing dams compiled by The Nature
Conservancy sourced from state databases (Martin and Apse, 2011), and a list of dams
removed between 1990 and 2017 compiled by American Rivers (American Rivers,
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2018). Because most dam records are kept at the state level, and each state has
different standards, there is a large degree of inconsistency in the scope of data
available for each dam. We required only that dams were spatially explicit (i.e.,
latitude and longitude was available). Following Martin and Levine (2017), we loaded
individual dam points into ArcGIS and snapped them to the nearest flowline available
on the Medium Resolution National Hydrography Dataset Plus, Version 2 (NHDPlus
v2) (Horizon Systems, 2012). We used a snapping tolerance of 100 meters to avoid
erroneous associations, and kept the remaining dams that fell in USGS hydrologic unit
code (HUC) regions 01 and 02.
Our final data set contains 11,601 dams, of which 395 (3.4%) are identified as
removed. Consistent with global and national data, our sample indicates an upward
trend in dam removals (Figure 1). Existing and removed dams are unevenly distributed
between states (Figure 2). Delaware has the fewest existing dams (91) and New York
has the most (1,972). About half of the removed dams in our sample (197) are
concentrated in one state, Pennsylvania. Massachusetts has the second highest number
of removals (35).
For each dam, we calculated a suite of physical and ecological attributes that
are likely to be important determinants of removal status using custom ArcGIS tools
developed by Martin and Apse (2011). We associated each dam with census tract-level
demographics (U.S. Census Bureau, 2017), acknowledging that individual dam
removal efforts are sometimes derailed by local public opposition (Fox et al., 2016).
We categorized potential removal determinants as physical, ecological, and
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demographic controls1 (Table 1). We identify dams upstream of a state border as
‘treated’, and those with no state border downstream as ‘controls’. Of 11,601 dams in
our full sample, 6,681 (57.6%) are located upstream of a state border. Finally, we
calculate our continuous treatment variable, downstream distance to a state border,
using ArcGIS and R.
We compare summary statistics between existing and removed dams using ttests (Table 1, first three columns). On average, removed dams have fewer
downstream barriers than existing dams, though they are roughly equidistant from the
river mouth. Removed dams tend to be on higher stream order (i.e., relatively larger)
rivers that are less sloped than existing dams. Removed dams have larger functional
networks, exist in watersheds with greater overall species richness, and have a higher
number of anadromous species documented downstream than existing dams. Finally,
removed dams are more likely to be in densely-populated and lower-income census
tracts. The differences are generally consistent with the dam removal literature, which
finds removed dams are unrepresentative of the existing dam population (Grabowski
et al., 2018; Magilligan et al., 2016).
We also use t-tests to compare characteristics of dams that are upstream of a
state border (treated dams) and dams that have no state border along their downstream
flowpath (control dams) (Table 1, last three columns). Statistically significant
differences exist between treatment and control groups across all but one variable, the
proportion falling on conserved land. The systematic differences between treatment

1

We do not control for the expected cost of removal, since existing removal cost models are based on
dam size (height and/or length) that is not available consistently in our data. However, within our set
of physical controls are geologic features that are related to dam size, and thus expected removal cost.
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and control groups are likely driven by their spatial distribution, since treated dams are
much more likely to be located away from the coast (Figure 3). The observed
differences between treatment and control motivate our empirical approach, which we
outline in the next section.

5. Empirical strategy

We use logistic regressions to model the determinants of dam removal. In
particular, we are interested in clean identification of a state border proximity effect,
which would indicate the presence of an environmental federalism story. We employ
two strategies. First, we preprocess the data to reduce model dependency using two
different matching approaches. Then we employ an instrumental variable for border
proximity to address endogeneity.

5.1 Logit model

We observe 𝑦, the binary removal status of each dam.
𝑦𝑖 = {

1 if dam 𝑖 is removed
0 if dam 𝑖 is existing

We relate the conditional probability that dam 𝑖 is removed, 𝑝𝑖 , to a vector of
observable features of the dam denoted by 𝒙𝑖 through a function 𝐹(⋅) with a vector of
parameters 𝜷.
𝑝𝑖 = Pr[𝑦𝑖 = 1|𝒙] = 𝐹(𝒙′𝒊 𝜷)
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(1)

We specify 𝐹(⋅) as the cumulative distribution function of the logistic distribution to
arrive at a logit model, which can be rearranged so the log-odds ratio is linear in 𝒙𝑖 .
We expand below for clarity with the 𝑖 subscripts dropped.
𝑝

ln 1−𝑝 = 𝛿 ⋅ 𝐷𝑈𝑆 + 𝛾 ⋅ 𝐷𝑈𝑆 ⋅ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑈𝑆 + 𝒙′𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡 ⋅ 𝜷𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡 + 𝛼𝑠 + 𝑢

(2)

In equation (2), 𝐷𝑈𝑆 is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the dam is upstream
of a state border, 0 otherwise, and 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑈𝑆 is the downstream distance (in km) to a state
border. 𝒙𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡 is a vector of physical, ecological, and demographic controls regarded as
important determinants of 𝑝. We include 𝛼𝑠 , a vector of state-level fixed effects, to
control for time-invariant factors that make states more or less likely to remove dams.
Finally, 𝑢 is an error term. 𝛿 estimates the effect of being upstream of a border on the
log-odds of removal, and 𝛾 indicates how the effect differs depending on border
proximity. We report marginal effects for our main variables according to the
following equation.
̅′𝑻 𝜷) ⋅ 𝛿
Marginal effect of 𝐷𝑈𝑆 = 𝐹 ′ (𝒙

(3)

̅′𝑻 𝜷) ⋅ 𝛾
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑈𝑆 = 𝐹 ′ (𝒙
In equation (3), 𝐹′(⋅) is the partial derivate of equation (1) with respect to the relevant
̅𝑻 is a vector containing the mean covariate values for the
variable, 𝐷𝑈𝑆 or 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑈𝑆 , and 𝒙
treated group. Thus, we report marginal effects evaluated at the mean values of
covariates of the treatment group.

5.2 Binary and continuous matching to preprocess the data
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We use two matching methods to preprocess our data prior to model estimation
(Fong et al., 2018; Ho et al., 2007). Our main variable of interest is a continuous
measure of downstream distance to a state border, 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑈𝑆 . In constructing that
variable, we necessarily identify which dams are upstream of a state border, 𝐷𝑈𝑆 . Our
data, therefore, provides an opportunity to compare model results obtained after
preprocessing the data using binary and continuous matching. Despite the availability
of methods to accommodate continuous treatment, it is still common in applied work
to dichotomize continuous treatments and perform binary matching. In the economics
literature we could find just three examples of matching using continuous treatment
(Berhane et al., 2014; Birthal et al., 2015; Magrini et al., 2017). A few studies report
loss of information from binary matching compared to continuous (e.g., Cerulli et al.,
2018; Fong et al., 2018). However, no such information loss is expected in a data
preprocessing application where matching precedes model estimation. Instead we can
check the consistency of results.
Our goal with both forms of matching is to reduce potential bias resulting from
model dependency. As noted, significant differences exist between dams that are
upstream of state borders (treated observations) and dams that have no border
downstream (controls) across most of the observed variables (Table 1). These
systematic differences indicate a lack of covariate balance between the two groups,
which forces our model to extrapolate over the range that lacks common support. Ho
et al. (2007) show how extrapolation leads to coefficient estimates that are sensitive to
functional form assumptions, and how matching can reduce the sensitivity.
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Given the relatively large number of potential confounders in our data, we
match on a propensity score using the binary treatment framework developed by
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and extended to multivalued and continuous treatments
by Imbens (2000). We calculate a propensity score using the scoring function that
optimizes covariate balance between treated and control groups (Fong et al., 2018;
Imai and Ratkovic, 2014) using the R package CBPS (Fong et al., 2017). The method
diminishes potential effects from misspecifying the propensity score model for both
binary (Imai and Ratkovic, 2014) and continuous (Fong et al., 2018) treatments.
Then we use the R package MatchIt (Ho et al., 2011) to implement 3:1 nearestneighbor matching with replacement. Because controls can be and are reused as
matches, we calculate weights that we use in subsequent regressions.

5.3 Instrumental variable analysis

Our variable of interest, 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑈𝑆 , which measures the downstream distance
between a dam and a state border, is potentially endogenous: unobservable factors
may play a role in determining a dam’s location relative to a state border. For instance,
dams tend to be more prevalent closer to state and international borders as a result of
state-level freeriding in water quantity (Olmstead and Sigman, 2015) or quality
(Sigman, 2005). Since similar factors could contribute to dam removal decisions,
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑈𝑆 likely suffers from endogeneity.
We introduce a plausibly exogenous variable, the percentage of the census
tract population commuting to work out of state, as an instrument for downstream
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distance to a state border. The quality of our instrument rests on two assumptions.
First, the percentage of the population commuting out of state must be a strong
predictor of downstream distance to a state border. We test the validity of this
assumption by estimating the following first stage model and assessing the F-statistic.
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑈𝑆 = 𝜃 ⋅ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑡𝑒 + 𝒙′ 𝜷 + 𝜖

(4)

In equation (4), 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑡𝑒 is the instrument, the percentage of the population
commuting to work out of state, and 𝒙 contains all the same controls as equation (2).
The second assumption is that the percentage of the population commuting to
work out of state only impacts dam removal likelihood through 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑈𝑆 . Though
untestable, we consider it a reasonable and logical assumption. Since our second stage
model is nonlinear (equation 2) we proceed using the two-stage residual inclusion
(2SRI) method (Terza et al., 2008) and obtain standard errors via bootstrapping. If the
exclusion restriction holds, we have purged the endogenous variation from our
estimate for 𝛾, the effect of state border proximity on the log-odds of dam removal.

6. Results

6.1 Covariate balance in the matched datasets

Datasets resulting from the two matching procedures (i.e., using binary (Imai
and Ratkovic, 2014) versus continuously (Fong et al., 2018) defined treatment)
include the same treated observations but different control groups. Of 4,920 potential
control observations, binary and continuous matching utilize 2,824 and 4,479,
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respectively. We compare covariate means across treatment and control groups using
t-tests (Table 2). Statistically significant differences persist post-matching, and they
are particularly large in the continuous treatment dataset. Nonetheless the postmatching t-statistics are a marked improvement over their pre-matching counterparts
(Table 1). Aside from that, these types of hypothesis tests are inappropriate to assess
balance despite their common usage (Imai et al., 2008).
The main purpose of matching is to improve covariate overlap between
treatments and controls, which we assess in more detail for an important covariate.
The downstream distance from a dam to the river mouth is clearly correlated with the
downstream distance to a state border, if one exists. It is also a major determinant of
dam removal decisions, since dams located closer to the coast will have greater
benefits for sea-run fish. In our raw data the average downstream distance to the coast
is 276.2 km for treated dams and 81.7 km for control dams, a large statistical
difference (t-stat = 82.2). Observing the distributions (Figure 4a) clarifies the issue.
There are few control dams available for matching to the treated dams that are farthest
away from the coast. Binary matching eliminates the statistical difference in means (tstat = 0.78) but it persists following continuous matching (t-stat = 41.2). However,
both matching approaches provide vast improvements in distributional overlap (Figure
4b and 4c).

6.2 Regression results
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Results from model (2) using the raw (unmatched) data indicate that being
upstream of a state border increases the probability of removal by 1.8 percentage
points, and the probability increases by 0.08 percentage points for every 10 km of
additional upstream distance (Table 3 Column 3). The results are qualitatively robust
to the inclusion of controls, but the control variables and state fixed effects have a
noticeable impact on magnitude. As expected, excluding controls leads to an
underestimation of the border proximity effect owing to correlation with treatment and
the negative relationship between distance to the coast and removal likelihood.
Excluding state fixed effects overestimates the effect from being upstream of a state
border, likely due to the high concentration of overall removals in Pennsylvania. We
report pseudo R-squared values calculated using the McKelvey and Zavoina method,
which most closely mirrors the interpretation of OLS R-squared (Veall and
Zimmermann, 1996). We loosely take the pseudo R-squared of 0.45 (Table 3 Column
3) to mean that model (1) explains about half the variation in dam removal likelihood.
The estimates from model (2) on matched datasets are directly comparable to
the estimates on our raw data (Table 3). The results are qualitatively similar across
unmatched and matched datasets, with some differences in magnitude. Both flavors of
matching yield estimates for the state border effect that are larger than the unmatched
estimates. The effect of having a downstream state border on dam removal probability
is slightly larger for binary matching (3.8 percentage points) compared to continuous
matching (2.8 percentage points). The additional effect for each 10 km in downstream
distance to the border is 0.06 percentage points using binary matching and 0.09
percentage points using continuous matching. In other terms, dams that are one
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standard deviation farther upstream from a state border are between 0.7 and 1.0
percentage points more likely to be removed. Pseudo R-squared is slightly higher for
binary (0.51) compared to continuous matching (0.46). Overall, the two types of
matching do not result in large differences in the marginal effect estimates from
equation (2).
We turn now to the instrumental variable results using the unmatched, binary,
and continuously matched datasets (Table 4). The first stage OLS estimates indicate
that the instrument is strongly correlated with distance to state boarder. A one
percentage point increase in the census tract population commuting out of state is
associated with dams in the tract being between 1.6 and 1.9 km closer downstream to a
state border. Statistical significance of the coefficients and high F-statistics, between
450.1 and 834.7, indicate strong correlation of the instrument with the endogenous
variable.
The instrumental variable results are consistent across matching methods, and
we find larger effect sizes compared to our naïve analysis. Removal probability
increases by between 6.2 and 7.4 percentage points when a dam is located upstream of
a state border. For those dams, each 10 km of downstream distance to a state border
increases the probability of removal by between 0.5 and 0.6 percentage points. In
terms of standard deviations, each standard deviation of upstream distance from a state
border increases the removal likelihood by between 5.8 and 7.0 percentage points.
Pseudo R-squared values are similar to other analyses, with the highest value obtained
from the binary matched dataset (0.52).
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7. Discussion

To put our results in context, we compare the probability of removal for dams
located different distances upstream of a state border. We present the calculations
using the instrumental variable results from our two matched datasets (Table 4
Columns 2 and 3). First, a dam located immediately upstream of a state border is 7.1 –
7.3 percentage points more likely to be removed than a similar dam with no
downstream border. Compare that to a dam located 106.9 km upstream of a border, the
mean value in our data. For this dam, removal is 5.7 – 6.5 percentage points more
likely than the first dam, and 13.1 – 13.6 percentage points more likely than a similar
dam with no downstream border.
The differences in probability of removal upstream of borders versus when no
border is downstream are statistically significant, but the magnitudes are modest.
Despite the overall trend, the small proportion of removed dams (3.4% in our data)
suggests that dam removal is still in its infancy. A geospatial analysis of removed
dams in six New England states concluded that removals have resulted from ‘strategic
opportunism’, whereby removal advocates respond opportunistically to individual dam
owners who are usually driven by economic or safety concerns (Magilligan et al.,
2016). We agree generally with this characterization, but our results suggest there is
more ‘strategy’ on the part of some actors, particularly at the state level.
We note, however, a few caveats and alternative explanations. Despite our best
efforts to eliminate bias and isolate strategic behavior by states, we faced significant
data limitations. Most notably, we lack data on the age of individual dams and their
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purpose for removal. It could be that states favor dam removals upstream of borders to
achieve some other, nonstrategic goal. We do not know, for example, whether dam
building was spatially and temporally correlated. Older dams, which pose a greater
safety risk, may be concentrated further upstream of state borders. Alternatively, states
could favor dam removals that benefit native cold-water species. Colder waters tend to
be located in higher elevations and lower stream orders, which correlate with upstream
distance to state borders in our study area.
Regardless of the underlying mechanism, our results suggest a discrepancy
between state and regional objectives. Inefficiencies from state-level environmental
rulemaking have been uncovered in air quality (Gray and Shadbegian, 2004), water
quality (Gray and Shadbegian, 2004; Lipscomb and Mobarak, 2017; Sigman, 2005,
2002), and water quantity (Olmstead and Sigman, 2015). Our findings provide initial
evidence that environmental federalism contributes to inefficient production of
ecological restoration outcomes. Coordinating barrier removals within and across river
basins can improve the efficiency of river restoration efforts (Fitzpatrick and Neeson,
2018; Neeson et al., 2015; Roy et al., 2018). However, our results suggest that statelevel decision making poses an institutional barrier to broader coordination. The
implications extend to other spatially explicit conservation strategies looking to
maximize biological gains by reducing habitat fragmentation, including terrestrial
protected areas (Fremier et al., 2015). Operationalizing these types of strategies,
therefore, may require the application of existing or novel incentive structures to align
state and federal conservation objectives.
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Finally, we note a methodological finding. Our estimation results were
consistent between binary and continuous treatment variables and matching methods
despite a relatively large difference in the number of observations (9,505 for binary
matching and 11,150 for continuous matching). One study in the economics literature
comparing results from continuous and binary matching (Cerulli et al., 2018) found
significant loss of information from dichotomizing their treatment variable. In
contrast, our goal with matching was to preprocess the data prior to model estimation
(Ho et al., 2007). For data preprocessing applications like ours, the choice between
matching methods appears to hold little importance.

8. Conclusion

In this paper we asked whether environmental federalism, or decentralized
decision making, is a determinant of which dams are chosen for removal. Dam
removals are an increasingly common approach to river restoration, owing to their
effectiveness for restoring ecosystem function and recovering native fish populations
(Bednarek, 2001). Coordinating removal decisions across larger geographies leads to
more efficient outcomes (Roy et al., 2018), but states may have more inward-looking
objectives.
We constructed a comprehensive and spatially explicit database of existing and
removed dams in order to model the determinants of dam removal. To test for an
environmental federalism story, we preprocessed our dataset using two matching
strategies and employed an instrumental variable to identify the effect of state border
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proximity on dam removal likelihood. Our results indicate dams located upstream of a
state border are about 7 percentage points more likely to be removed than similar
dams with no downstream border. Removal likelihood increases for dams located
farther upstream of the border at a rate of between 5.8 and 7.0 percentage points per
standard deviation. Our results are qualitatively the same across different models and
matching strategies.
We consider our results evidence that state-level dam removal decisions
diverge from larger scale prioritization or optimization efforts. However, the overall
effect on social welfare depends on the extent to which benefits from dam removal are
a global or local public good. The closer benefits are to a global (local) public good,
the greater (smaller) the welfare loss from decentralized decisions. A nuanced analysis
may uncover that states actually are best equipped to make socially optimal location
decisions for restoration projects. Though beyond the scope of this paper, it is an
important area for potential research in the area of environmental federalism in
restoration and conservation more generally. We highlight additional research
opportunities below.
As the number of dam removals expands over time and space, this will
continue to be an appropriate setting to study the consequences of environmental
federalism for efficient restoration and conservation objectives. More data can mean
better identification. For instance, some dams in the central and western US may
predate the drawing of state borders. For that subpopulation, downstream distance to
the border is plausibly random, especially when the border is a straight line
corresponding to a parallel or meridian. Another potential with expanded data is to
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look for possible mitigating factors such as the strength of other interstate watershed
coordination agreements. Such studies will serve a larger goal of designing
frameworks to operationalize large scale, efficiency-based conservation and
restoration strategies.
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Figure 1. Dam removal frequency by year (1990-2017)
Note: N=396
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Figure 2. Number of existing and removed dams by state as of 2017
Notes: N=11,601. States are ordered by frequency of removals
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Treated Dams
(Upstream of State
Border)

Control Dams
(Not Upstream of State
Border)

Figure 3. Geospatial distribution of treatment and control groups
Note: N=11,601.
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Figure 4. Comparison of densities for main confounder before and after matching
Notes: Downstream distance to river mouth (km) is along x-axis. Observations from control group (no
state border downstream) are weighted according to their frequency as matches.

84

85

12.97
25.74
14.12
1.08
43.07
34.36
0.4239
0.57
35.03
36.55
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0.034
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Notes: N=11,601. Bold indicates p-value ≤ 0.10.
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70.84
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3.00
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0.013
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82.20
44.64
18.78
18.46
4.10
20.62

6.51

6.84
1.59

1
0.727
118.4

0
0.571
106.9

Proportion removed
Proportion with a state border on downstream flowpath
Downstream distance to state border, if one exists (km)
Physical controls
Downstream distance to river mouth (km)
Number of downstream barriers
Downstream passability product
Total functional network (km)
River size class
Slope
Proportion on a state border
Ecological controls
Landcover in contributing watershed
% Impervious
% Agriculture
% Natural
Proportion falling on conserved land
Cumulative disturbance index
Number of anadromous species downstream
Species richness (within HUC-8)
Demographic controls (Census tract-level)
Population density (per sq km)
Per capita income ($1,000s)
% Collecting Social Security
Proportion of sample

t-stat

t-stat

Removed

Existing

Variable

Not
Upstream
Upstream
of Border
of Border
0.022
0.043
0
1
107.4

Table 1. Result of t-tests for pre-matching difference in means by outcome variable and treatment
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41.21
20.23
9.28
11.26
1.07
16.39

13.12
6.54
6.38
0.46
9.66
4.26
1.66
6.07
13.91
0.97
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3.98
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1.02
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6.75
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13.14
0.36
3.61
3.4
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7.3
0.043
568.0
1.86
0.014

3.0
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73.0
0.175
2.04
0.56
39.89
0.60
33.99
37.2
2824
0.297
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8.5
0.062
503.4
1.84
0.016

3.1
13.3
73.3
0.173
2.27
0.56
36.50
0.57
35.04
36.6
6681

Upstream of
Border

Continuous Matching
Not
Upstream t-stat
of Border

Notes: All variables were used to obtain optimized propensity scores based on binary (presence/absence of
downstream border) and continuous (downstream distance to state border) definitions of treatment. Propensity scores
are used in subsequent 3:1 nearest neighbor matching. Treated observations are constant across samples. Control
observations are weighted according to their frequency as matches. Bold indicates p-value ≤ 0.10.

Physical controls
Downstream distance to river mouth (km)
Number of downstream barriers
Downstream passability product
Total functional network (km)
River size class
Slope
Ecological controls
Landcover in contributing watershed
% Impervious
% Agriculture
% Natural
Proportion falling on conserved land
Cumulative disturbance index
Number of anadromous species downstream
Species richness (within HUC-8)
Demographic controls (Census tract-level)
Population density (per sq km)
Per capita income ($1,000s)
% Collecting Social Security
N
Proportion of sample (unweighted)

Variable

Binary Matching
Not
Upstream t-stat
of Border

Table 2. Result of t-tests for difference in means on matched subsamples

87

Notes: Dependent variable is status of the dam (0 = existing, 1 = removed). *,**,*** indicate significance at the
90%, 95% and 99% level, respectively.

Table 3. Marginal effects from logistic regression

Table 4. IV Results

Notes: First stage is OLS and dependent variable is downstream distance to state border. Second stage
are marginal effects from a logistic regression where the dependent variable is status of the dam (0 =
existing, 1 = removed) and residuals from first stage are included as a regressor. Both stages include full
suite of controls including state fixed effects. Second stage standard errors are bootstrapped using 1,000
replications. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level, respectively.
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ABSTRACT
Increasing the provision of one ecosystem service often comes only at the
expense of others. Effective management requires understanding the biophysical
relationships governing these tradeoffs, as well as stakeholder preferences for the
tradeoffs. In this paper we apply microeconomic principles of production and
consumption to empirically identify efficient and socially desirable ecosystem service
outcomes. We use a production possibilities model to quantify the tradeoffs among
four ecosystem services from dam removal in Maine: hydropower, lake shoreline,
herring, and Atlantic salmon. Then we conduct a choice experiment survey to
understand public preferences for the services, using latent class analysis to group
respondents with common preferences. Finally, we estimate indifference curves and
combine them with the production possibilities model to identify preferred ecosystem
service outcomes by group. Results indicate that stakeholders with apparently
diverging values can sometimes agree on preferred outcomes when we account for the
productive capacity of the ecosystem. Additionally, we find that the common practice
of reducing multidimensional ecosystem service tradeoff analyses to two dimensions
can result in lost welfare. Generally, our empirical application demonstrates the
practical usability of this framework for incorporating diverse stakeholder preferences
into ecosystem management planning.
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1. Introduction

Ecosystem services are the benefits that humans derive from the environment.
Because of the biophysical relationships governing their production, managing
ecosystem services often implies increasing some at the expense of others (Bennett et
al., 2009). Significant progress has been made developing models to quantify these
tradeoffs using the economic concept of a production possibilities frontier (PPF) (e.g.,
Ager et al., 2017; Roy et al., 2018; White et al., 2012), but the biophysical models do
not tell us which outcomes are most desirable. Methodologies for incorporating
stakeholder preferences are needed to transform the models into viable tools for
decision making, especially when stakeholder groups have different values (Cord et
al., 2017). One promising framework is firmly grounded in welfare economics, using
the concept of indifference curves to identify utility-maximizing combinations of
ecosystem services from a production possibilities model (Cavender-Bares et al.,
2015). While the general economic theory extends to higher dimensions, it has been
suggested that reducing analyses to two dimensions is desirable to utilize the
framework for decision making (King et al., 2015).
This paper asks how the PPF – indifference curve framework can be
implemented empirically to facilitate ecosystem service management decisions, and it
studies the implications of simplifying multidimensional tradeoffs to two dimensions.
In empirical simulations of ecosystem service production possibilities, it is common to
bundle correlated services into two groups or to consider a single, representative twoway tradeoff (e.g., Nalle et al., 2004; Polasky et al., 2008). Doing so facilitates
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visualization, comprehension, and computation. In a decision-making framework
intended to integrate variation in stakeholder preferences, comprehension through
visualization is especially important. However, there is no guarantee that preferences
and production will be correlated along the same lines. If this is the case, the socially
desirable level of one service will depend on which competing service it is paired
against. As a result, welfare could suffer, stakeholder conflicts could arise
unnecessarily, and opportunities for consensus could be missed.
This paper makes a couple of important contributions. First, it is the first
empirical application combining a production possibilities model with utility-theoretic
indifference curves to identify socially preferred ecosystem service outcomes.
Cavender-Bares et al. (2015) proposed applying the microeconomic framework to
navigate ecosystem tradeoff decisions. In a follow up paper, King et al. (2015) use
hypothetical indifference curves and production models to facilitate stakeholder
discussions in a workshop setting. We are not aware of any empirical examples of the
explicit theoretical framework that adhere to its microeconomic foundations. Thus, we
contribute by demonstrating a practical method for implementing the framework using
a choice experiment to estimate indifference curves.
Second, this research is unique in that the choice experiment is designed in
conjunction with the production possibilities model. The consistency allows us to
make meaningful comparisons of the insights gained from analyzing the production
possibilities model, the choice experiment, and the combined model. Hattam et al.
(2015) compare results of an ecological assessment with a choice experiment,
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concluding that the two are complementary. Our work goes one step further by
investigating additional insights gained from combining the two in a single model.
We set our study in the context of watershed-scale decisions about dam
removal in the state of Maine, USA. The dichotomy presented by dams and their
removal provides an ideal application for analyzing tradeoffs between services. We
use focus groups to identify four relevant ecosystem services: hydropower production,
lake shoreline, spawning habitat for herring, and spawning habitat for Atlantic salmon.
We utilize production functions for each service to create two-dimensional PPFs for
pairwise analysis of each dam-dependent service (hydropower and lakes) against each
that benefits from dam removal (herring and salmon populations). Each PPF identifies
Pareto efficient outcomes (i.e., combinations where production of one service cannot
be increased without decreasing production of the other). We compare the twodimensional tradeoff results to those obtained from a four-dimensional PPF, which
identifies four-way Pareto efficient outcomes by accounting for the production
relationships between all four services simultaneously.
Next we administer a choice experiment survey to understand public
preferences for the same four ecosystem services. We use the PPF results to identify
feasible levels of each service, which we use to create an efficient experimental
design. We analyze the results using a latent class model to identify groups holding
similar preferences. We estimate each group’s willingness to pay (WTP) for each
service, as well as the rate at which they are willing to trade one service for another
(i.e., the marginal rates of substitution). We use these marginal rates of substitution to
construct indifference curves, which we combine with the PPF to identify which
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Pareto efficient outcomes each group finds most desirable. Finally, we compare the
results derived from two-dimensional analyses to the results from four-dimensional
analysis in terms of a monetary welfare measure.
We find significant advantages for decision making from analyzing the PPF
and choice experiment results jointly. For example, our choice experiment data
indicates significant variation across stakeholder groups in WTP for the ecosystem
services. We find, however, that variations in WTP do not necessarily result in large
disagreements about desired outcomes. The magnitude of disagreement depends on
the shape of the PPF, and seemingly large disagreements may actually be
noncontentious. Additionally, in contrast to WTP analysis, utilizing indifference
curves in conjunction with PPFs enables us to incorporate preferences for stakeholders
who refuse to value ecosystem services monetarily.
We also find that simplifying multidimensional problems to two dimensions
can have undesirable consequences. Bundling or proxying sets of correlated ecosystem
services into two groups can be a convenient way to facilitate visualization,
comprehension, and computation of tradeoffs (King et al., 2015). However, our twoway results indicate that the preferred level of a service often depends on which
service it is paired against. Further, we find welfare losses associated with identifying
preferred ecosystem service outcomes in two dimensions compared to a fourdimensional analysis.
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2. Concepts

Grounded in economic production theory, a production possibilities frontier
(PPF) identifies the maximum amount of a good or service that can be produced
holding production of other goods and services constant. Combinations of goods and
services that define the PPF are efficient in the sense that productive capacity is fully
utilized. When capacity is fully utilized, increasing production of one good or service
can come only at the expense of others. In this way the PPF allows us to quantify and
visualize tradeoffs, particularly in simple, two-dimensional cases along the familiar xy plane.
A PPF can easily be applied to the production of ecosystem services, and it can
be a helpful tool for decision makers (Vallet et al., 2018). In this context, a PPF
identifies combinations of services that fully utilize the productive capacity of an
ecosystem. Some researchers reduce higher dimension problems to two dimensions,
presumably to ease computation and facilitate visualization. One approach is to group
correlated ecosystem services (King et al., 2015). For example, Polasky et al. (2008)
group vertebrate species and industrial activities in order to analyze the two-way
tradeoff between biodiversity and economic returns. Another approach is to focus on
the main tradeoff between two primary services, which become de facto proxies for
other, correlated services. Mastrangelo and Laterra (2015) study the tradeoffs
associated with deforestation in Argentina by focusing on cattle production and avian
biodiversity. Simplifications like these accurately describe the biophysical tradeoffs
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between the two ecosystem services, but problems could arise as we incorporate
stakeholder preferences, which may include a broader range of services.
Integrating preferences into PPF models can transform the biophysical model
into a useful decision-support tool (Cord et al., 2017). Theoretically, PPF analysis can
be combined with stakeholder preferences represented by indifference curves to
identify preferred outcomes (Cavender-Bares et al., 2015; King et al., 2015). The
points along an indifference curve represent combinations of ecosystem services that
deliver a fixed level of utility, or well-being. The slope indicates how much of one
service an individual is willing to trade off to gain additional units of another service
without sacrificing utility. Thus, it represents preferences for tradeoffs between
services. To theoretically maximize utility in a two-dimensional example, an
individual wants to be on an indifference curve as far from the origin as possible (i.e.,
where she is receiving more of both services). She is bound, however, by the
biophysical constraints of the ecosystem, represented by the PPF. The utility
maximizing solution, therefore, occurs at the point of tangency between PPF and
indifference curve. At this point the slopes are equated—stakeholder willingness to
tradeoff matches the ecosystem’s ability to generate tradeoffs.
Despite its theoretical attractiveness, applications of the PPF – indifference
curve framework are relatively rare. King et al. (2015) utilize the framework in
workshops, creating hypothetical PPFs and indifference curves to identify potential
solutions when there is variation in stakeholder preferences. In a similar application,
Stosch et al. (2019) ask stakeholders their beliefs about the shape of a PPF, and how
they perceive others’ preferences for the tradeoffs in order to facilitate discussion. In
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the sole empirical example that we could find, Mastrangelo and Laterra (2015)
construct indifference curves using a Likert scale measure of landholders’ intent to
engage in conservation practices, which they combine with an empirical PPF to
identify preferred outcomes. We contribute to this general literature by incorporating
an established technique for estimating indifference curves that is consistent with the
utility-theoretic underpinning of the PPF – indifference curve framework.
Discrete choice experiments, a common nonmarket valuation method
employed by environmental economists, allow straightforward estimation of
indifference curve slopes. In a choice experiment, respondents face a set of options
described by a series of attributes. In an ecosystem services context, each option may
represent a management plan described by the levels of services it is expected to
deliver. The analyst assumes the respondent chooses the option that maximizes her
utility, which depends in turn on the attribute levels.1 Researchers can then estimate
the relative contribution of each attribute to respondent utility, or the marginal utility
of each attribute. The ratio of marginal utilities from two attributes indicates the rate at
which respondents are willing to trade one attribute for another while maintaining a
constant level of utility. This marginal rate of substitution is identical to the slope of
an indifference curve. Choice experiments, therefore, are a natural method for
implementing the PPF – indifference curve framework empirically.

1

More formally, choice modelling is based on random utility theory, which assumes that only a
portion of utility can be described by the attribute levels. The additional portion is considered
unobservable, or random, following a specified distribution. See Train (2009) for a complete technical
treatment.
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3. Study context

We set our study in the context of dam removal decision making, a ripe
application for the PPF – indifference curve framework. Dams are a ubiquitous part of
the modern American landscape, numbering over two million nationwide (Smith et al.,
2002). Growing appreciation for the ecosystem services provided by freely flowing
rivers (Auerbach et al., 2014), though, has led to an increase in purposeful dam
removals. To date, over 1,400 dams have been removed in the US, with the vast
majority occurring in the past two decades (American Rivers, 2018). Currently, dams
tend to be selected for removal opportunistically (Magilligan et al., 2016), and
decisions can be governed by emotion over science (Fox et al., 2016). However, the
potential efficiency gains from coordinating dam removal decisions across large scales
are well understood (Neeson et al., 2015; Roy et al., 2018). Decision support tools are
needed that can mitigate variation in stakeholder preferences to realize efficiency
gains from coordination.
We focus specifically on dam removal in the Penobscot Watershed in Maine,
USA (Figure 1). The watershed boasts a drainage area of over 8,500 square miles,
roughly one third of the state, and is home to 112 dams spread across 7,000 river
miles. The large number of dams translates to many possible dam removal scenarios,
which allows us to construct a PPF with meaningful tradeoffs. Additionally, the
Penobscot is an attractive candidate for watershed-scale policy coordination. Despite
its size it is located entirely within a single state jurisdiction. Also, the Penobscot has
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some, albeit limited, history of coordinating removal decisions across multiple dams
(Opperman et al., 2011).
We held focus groups in the study area to identify four ecosystem services on
which to focus. Two rely on the presence of dams: hydropower and dammed lakes,
and two benefit from dam removal: river herring and Atlantic salmon populations.
Hydropower in Maine is significant, accounting for nearly one third of net electricity
production in the state (United States EIA, 2019). Within the Penobscot Watershed, 17
dams are licensed to generate hydropower for a total installed capacity of 167,469 kW,
enough to supply about 155,000 homes with relatively clean energy. Dams also
support and stabilize the level of lakes, which have recreational and aesthetic value.
There are approximately 3,020 miles of lake shoreline in the Penobscot Watershed, of
which roughly 500 miles depend on the presence of dams.
The main beneficiaries of dam removal are fish, particularly river herring and
Atlantic salmon. Both are anadromous species, meaning they spawn in freshwater
river systems, migrate to the ocean as juveniles, and return to freshwater to spawn
subsequent generations. Because dams physically block up and downstream migration,
they are a known cause of declining fisheries (Nations, 2001) and they have
contributed to the current listing of Atlantic salmon as an endemically endangered
species (Limburg and Waldman, 2009). Atlantic salmon hold intrinsic value, while
river herring hold joint importance to the ecosystem as a keystone species and to the
Maine economy as a source of bait for the state’s lobster fishery. The current
configuration of dams in the Penobscot Watershed provides accessible habitat to
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support about 5,000 Atlantic salmon and 260,000 river herring (23% and 2% of the
respective historic populations).

4. Methods

4.1 Production possibilities frontier

To generate the PPF, we used the New England Dams Database (https://ddcnedams.sr.unh.edu/) combined with hydropower capacity licensing data from the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC, 2019), hydrologic data (USGS,
2017), and fish passage and habitat suitability models (Roy et al., 2018). There are 112
dams in the Penobscot Watershed. Of these dams, 17 are licensed to generate
hydropower, 58 have a lake or pond reservoir, and 62 block historic upstream habitat
for Atlantic salmon. We followed the methods in Roy et al. (2018) to measure upper
and lower limits of attribute values based on hypothetical scenarios in which all dams
in the basin are either kept in current condition or completely removed. While
hydropower capacity is simply calculated as the cumulative sum of capacity across all
generating dams, Atlantic salmon carrying capacity requires a spatially explicit
ecological model that we describe below.
Population estimates for Atlantic salmon are based on available habitat extent,
quality, and accessibility data (Roy et al., 2018)

𝑆 = 𝑐 ∑ [ℎ𝑖 ∏ (𝑝𝑗 )]
𝑖∈𝑛𝑑

𝑗∈𝑛𝑑𝑖
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(1)

where 𝑆 is annual Atlantic salmon spawning population capacity (number of fish); 𝑛𝑑
is the set of all dams, indexed by 𝑖; 𝑛𝑑𝑖 is the set of all dams downstream from and
including dam 𝑖, indexed by j; ℎ𝑖 is the functional habitat accessible above dam 𝑖
(km2); 𝑝𝑗 is the upstream and downstream product of probability of passage through
downriver dam 𝑗; and 𝑐 is the annual population carrying capacity (number of fish m-2
a-1). We determine the spatial distribution of functional habitat hi based on physical
surveys and historic accounts (Houston et al., 2007; Martin and Apse, 2011), and
estimate functional habitat quality based on environmental (Olivero and Anderson,
2008) and hydrologic (USGS, 2017) model data and suitability requirements
(Armstrong et al., 2003; NOAA, 2009)
ℎ𝑖 = ∑ [𝑎𝑟 𝑡𝑟 𝑣𝑟 𝜗𝑟 ⋅ 0.8]

(2)

𝑟∈𝑔𝑖

where 𝑔𝑖 is the set of river reaches immediately above dam 𝑖, indexed by 𝑟, 𝑎𝑟 is the
mean annual wetted area within reach 𝑟 (m2), 𝑡𝑟 is the mean annual temperature factor
in reach 𝑟, 𝑣𝑟 is the mean annual velocity factor in reach 𝑟, 𝜗𝑟 is a binary value
identifying if the river reach 𝑟 is historically accessible to Atlantic salmon, and 0.8 is
included to assume that 20% of available surface area exists along the river banks and
is unsuitable for habitat use due to natural river height fluctuations. Locations with
seasonal drying or tidal effects are excluded from analysis to reflect species’ long-term
intolerance of these conditions for spawning and rearing (Armstrong et al., 2003;
NOAA, 2009).
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4.2 Choice experiment survey and modelling

We administered a choice experiment survey to residents of the Penobscot
Watershed to elicit preferences for the ecosystem service tradeoffs from dam removal.
The survey consisted of four parts. First, we asked respondents about their perceptions
and usage of nearby rivers, and their prior knowledge of dam removal efforts. Next
was an informational section that described the current situation in terms of each
ecosystem service, and how the levels could be different in the future based on
alternative dam removal plans. This was immediately followed by the choice
experiment. We used feasible ranges for each ecosystem service from the PPF analysis
to create an efficient experimental design (Rose and Bliemer, 2009). Each respondent
faced six choices (see Figure 2 for an example). In the final section we asked a series
of demographic questions and questions to elicit environmental orientation (Dunlap et
al., 2000). Based on reports of low broadband penetration in the study area, we opted
for a postal mail survey utilizing five points of contact (Dillman et al., 2014). Data
collection took place between September and November of 2018. We received 204
responses with all six choice questions completed for a response rate of about 31%.
Choice experiment modelling is most commonly based on random utility
theory (Train, 2009). We assume the respondent chooses the available option that
maximizes her utility, which can be decomposed into observable and unobservable, or
random, components. The most basic model is a multinomial logit (MNL) which
assumes that the random components are independent and identically distributed and
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follow an extreme value type I (Gumbel) distribution. Next, we specify a functional
form for the observable portion of utility, 𝑣.
𝑣𝑖 = 𝛽𝑆𝑄 + 𝛽𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑚 𝑥𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑚 𝑖 + 𝛽ℎ𝑦𝑑 𝑥ℎ𝑦𝑑 𝑖 + 𝛽ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑥ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑖 + 𝛽𝑙𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝑥𝑙𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝑖 + 𝛽𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑥𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑖

(3)

Equation (3) says that 𝑣𝑖 , the observable portion of utility from alternative 𝑖, is a linear
combination of the level of Atlantic salmon (𝑥𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑖 ), hydropower (𝑥ℎ𝑦𝑑 𝑖 ), river
herring (𝑥ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖 ), lake shoreline (𝑥𝑙𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑖 ), and the cost (𝑥𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 ) of that alternative. Each
𝛽𝑘 is a parameter to be estimated, representing the marginal utility (i.e., the relative
contribution) of each attribute 𝑘. The marginal rate of substitution between two
attributes, 𝑥𝑘 and 𝑥𝑗 , is given by the ratio of marginal utilities, 𝛽𝑗 /𝛽𝑘 . This tells us the
rate at which respondents are willing to tradeoff one service for another without
compromising utility, and is, by definition, the slope of an indifference curve. In
nonmarket valuation applications, the researcher obtains an estimate of marginal WTP
by finding the marginal rate of substitution between an attribute and the marginal
utility of income, 𝛽𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 . Similarly, following Hanemann (1984), the total change in
welfare associated with a new dam removal plan can be estimated as follows:
CS = − 𝛽

1

𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡

[ln ∑𝑛 exp 𝑣𝑛1 − ln ∑𝑛 exp 𝑣𝑛0 ]

(4)

where CS is the compensating surplus welfare measure and 𝑣𝑛0 and 𝑣𝑛1 are the 𝑛th
residents’ utility before and after the change, respectively.
A particularly useful application of the PPF – indifference curve framework is
to identify areas of agreement and disagreement between groups. The basic MNL
model, though, assumes preferences are fixed across respondents. By relaxing a few of
the assumptions, we can obtain a latent class model (LCM). The LCM assumes that
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each respondent belongs to a group which shares common preferences. The researcher
can vary the number of groups, ultimately choosing based on model fit (Hensher et al.,
2015) and the meaningfulness of parameter estimates (Scarpa and Thiene, 2005).
Class membership is not observed by the researcher (i.e., classes are latent) but it can
be predicted ex post, allowing us to characterize each class based on the demographic
and attitudinal items presented in the survey. We use latent class analysis to create
indifference curves for each class, representing groups of stakeholders with similar
preferences.

4.3 Combining the results to identify preferred outcomes

Theoretically, the utility-maximizing combination of services is defined by the
point of tangency between the PPF and indifference curve. In an empirical application,
however, equating the slopes is impractical since the PPF is unlikely to be smooth.
Further, it becomes visually and computationally intractable in higher dimensions. It is
straightforward, though, to obtain the utility provided by each point along the PPF
using Equation 3 once it has been parameterized. From there we simply select the
point (i.e., the combination of services) that maximizes Equation 3 (the utility
function). For our two-way analyses, visual depiction of the tangency condition could
reveal insights that prove useful for facilitating discussions and negotiations. We
produce these two-dimensional visualizations by plotting a line segment, with slope
equal to the marginal rate of substitution, that intersects the PPF at the utility
maximizing point.
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5. Results and discussion

5.1 Production possibilities frontiers in two and four dimensions

The correlation between services from dams and between services from dam
removal are apparent in the shape of the two-dimensional PPFs (Figure 3). Qualitative
analysis using any of the two-way tradeoffs is similar. For all four PPFs, the current
configuration of dams is represented by the upper leftmost endpoint, where
hydropower and lake shoreline are maximized while both fish species are minimized.
The results indicate that we are underutilizing the capacity of the Penobscot
Watershed to produce services. Each graph features a flat segment at the top left,
indicating the ability to increase either fish population without sacrificing hydropower
or lake shoreline. In addition, all four PPFs are concave to the origin, representing the
fact that the cost of restoring fish is increasing in terms of either hydropower or lake
shoreline. Quantitative analysis, however, uncovers important differences.
Quantitatively, the two-dimensional results could be misleading if analyzed
individually. For example, the lake shoreline results indicate that we can recover
herring and Atlantic salmon to about 75% and 80% of their respective maximums with
virtually no loss to lakes. However, it is unclear from that analysis how hydropower
capacity would be affected. If we instead consider the tradeoff between both fish
species and hydropower, restoring herring or Atlantic salmon to the same levels
requires a 13% or 32% reduction in hydropower, respectively. We have no way to
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know, though, how lake shoreline would be affected by the reduction in hydropower.
To fully understand the interactions requires analyzing all four ecosystem services
jointly.
The four-dimensional analysis yields a surface defined by over 15,000 unique
combinations of dam removals. As in two-dimensions, each combination represents a
Pareto-efficient outcome—a situation where an increase to one service can only come
at the expense of at least one other. While a four-dimensional plot is feasible, its
usefulness for understanding tradeoffs and informing decision making is questionable.
We instead plot in two-dimensions (Figure 4), arbitrarily choosing hydropowersalmon space, only to note that each two-dimensional PPF (Figure 3) is a subset of the
four-dimensional results. As an alternative to visualization, we can study the efficient
outcomes in tabular form. We can learn, for example, that recovering herring to 75%
of maximum with virtually no loss to lake shoreline (an apparent win-win from the
two-way analysis) results in a 27% loss to hydropower capacity. The large number of
efficient combinations, though, renders this type of tabular analysis relatively useless
for comparing outcomes.
The virtues of two-dimensional simplifications are clear, as are the
shortcomings. Two-way PPFs are easy to visualize and understand conceptually. They
allow us to quickly understand the consequences of increasing production of one
ecosystem service in terms of another. The usefulness of this exercise is questionable,
though, since any effects on other services are ignored. On the other hand, higherdimensional analysis allows us to analyze the effects to all services jointly. However,
the excessive number of combinations and absence of a visual tool make meaningful
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comparisons difficult. In theory, the problem could be safely reduced to twodimensional analysis if the omitted services do not impact welfare. To learn which
services have value to humans, we turn to the results of our choice experiment.

5.2 Choice experiment results: willingness to pay and latent classes

Results from the choice experiment indicate that respondents value all four of
the ecosystem services. We focus first on the MNL results, which assume no variation
in preferences among respondents. All coefficients are statistically significant and
have the expected sign (Table 1). Generally, respondents prefer some new dam
removal plan to the status quo. They like plans that deliver more Atlantic salmon,
hydropower capacity, and herring, while maintaining lake shoreline. We obtain
marginal values for each service in dollar terms (Figure 5) by dividing each marginal
utility by the estimated cost coefficient and simulating confidence intervals (Krinsky
and Robb, 1986). We present the MNL results as a baseline, but move quickly to the
latent class analysis, which is both more behaviorally plausible and more informative
for decision making.
The latent class results suggest a significant degree of preference heterogeneity
between four groups of respondents (Table 1). We note a few differences in sign and
significance between classes. First, Class 2 is the only group that derives positive
utility from maintaining the status quo, while Class 3 is the only group that associates
negative utility with increasing the herring population. Though seemingly strange,
there is some evidence that herring may crowd out more highly valued species (FERC,
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1997). In our original specification the cost parameter for Class 4 was slightly positive
and statistically insignificant. In the final specification we fix the cost parameter at
zero, improving model fit, which indicates a lack of attendance to the cost attribute by
those respondents (Hensher et al., 2015). As a result, we are unable to calculate
monetary valuation estimates for Class 4.
We can begin to paint a picture of the groups holding varied preferences for
ecosystem services from dam removal by analyzing descriptive statistics (Table 2) and
WTP estimates (Figure 5) by class. Class 1, for example, is more likely to be male,
lower income, concerned for the environment, and regularly recreate on Penobscot
rivers. Members of this class have higher WTP for hydropower and lower WTP for
lake shoreline than members of any other class. Class 2 prefers maintaining the status
quo. They tend to be more averse to risks and less concerned for the environment than
other classes. Nonetheless, as a result of the low marginal utility they derive from
income, they hold higher WTP for salmon, herring, and lake shoreline compared to
other classes. Class 3 is more likely to be educated, higher income, and own or visit a
‘camp’ (a vacation cabin). They hold lower WTP for salmon and hydropower than
other classes, and would be willing to pay to reduce the number of herring. Finally,
Class 4 is more likely to be retired, highly concerned for the environment, and
perceive water quality in Penobscot rivers poorly. As noted, the zero cost coefficient
prevents estimating WTP, and seemingly indicates their refusal to put a monetary
value on nature.
The choice experiment results contain a lot of information about values and
preferences, but there are some notable shortcomings. We know, for example, that
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respondents have positive WTP for services provided by both dams and dam
removals. Lacking knowledge of the biophysical constraints of the system to jointly
produce the services, though, we are left to speculate about a feasible and desirable
balance between tradeoffs. Additionally, the latent class analysis is useful for
identifying group typologies, but the WTP results are not particularly helpful for
identifying areas of agreement or disagreement, and we have no way to incorporate
nonmonetary values (i.e., from Class 4). Next we combine the preference data
obtained from our choice experiment with the PPF.

5.3 Combining the results to identify preferred outcomes

First, we present a simple illustrative example, combining the MNL results
with an arbitrarily chosen hydropower-salmon two-way PPF (Figure 6). Maximum
utility is achieved by the combination of dam removals that delivers habitat to support
15,820 Atlantic salmon and generates hydropower for about 130,000 homes. Since the
PPF is relatively flat around the tangency point, combinations yielding slightly more
or less salmon will provide roughly the same utility. Uncertainty about the slope of the
indifference curve, represented by the 95% confidence interval, indicates that
anywhere along that flat portion of the PPF may actually be the most desirable. The
desirability of this two-way MNL solution, though, hinges on two assumptions: first,
that hydropower-salmon can accurately represent the broader tradeoffs between
services from dams and services from dam removal, and second, that variations in
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stakeholder preferences do not lead to variations in preferred solutions. We explore
these topics in depth below.
Representing preferences for different stakeholder groups as indifference
curves (Table 3) uncovers areas of agreement that were not necessarily apparent from
the WTP results (Figure 5). For example, Class 3 exhibited WTP for salmon and
hydropower that was about 50% lower than Class 1, yet the indifference curves for the
two groups have nearly identical slopes. Similarly, Classes 1 and 2 have statistically
indistinct indifference curves for lake shoreline-herring, but Class 2 exhibited WTP
for both services that was at least three times higher than Class 1. Classes 1, 2, and 3
all have similar preferences for the tradeoff between lake shoreline and salmon.
Finally, despite our inability to estimate WTP for Class 4, the indifference curve
approach allows that group to be included in our analysis. For example, we can see
that the hydropower-herring indifference curves for Class 1 and 4 are alike.
The degree to which groups agree or disagree on preferred outcomes depends
not only on indifference curve slopes, but how they interact with the shape of the PPF.
We can clearly see this by comparing the results for hydropower-salmon with lake
shoreline-salmon (Figure 7). In terms of hydropower-salmon, apparent similarities in
preferences (e.g., between Classes 1 and 3) yield different preferred outcomes when
combined with the PPF. On the other hand, the lake shoreline-salmon results show that
a sharp threshold in the PPF allows a set of wildly divergent indifference curves to
yield near-identical preferred outcomes.
Even when two PPFs have a similar shape, indicating a high degree of
correlation in their production, results can diverge if preferences are not correlated
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along the same lines. Consider hydropower-herring and hydropower-salmon (Figure
8). For Class 4, the preferred level of hydropower production is 83% of maximum
when paired against herring, but it drops to just 1% when analyzed against salmon.
One important unifying takeaway from our two-dimensional results is that the
preferred level of one ecosystem service depends on which service we choose to
analyze it against.
By analyzing all four services jointly we can obtain results that do not depend
on a decision about which two services we consider representative. In addition, our
four-dimensional results (Table 4) allow straightforward identification of agreements
and disagreements. For example, all four classes agree on the importance of
maintaining lake shoreline. In addition, Classes 1, 2, and 4 are all willing to sacrifice
hydropower to benefit herring and Atlantic salmon populations. The group posing the
largest impediment to agreement appears to be Class 3, particularly because of their
strong preference for hydropower over fish. Further, since we know Class 3 exhibits
negative WTP for herring, we may be able to move toward consensus by addressing
that concern in particular. The plethora of two-dimensional results, while easier to
visualize and comprehend individually, provide no such clarity. Given the tradeoff
between simplicity in two-way analysis versus clarity with higher dimension analysis,
it ultimately becomes a question of welfare. Do we suffer a welfare loss by
simplifying to two dimensions?
Our four-dimensional solution provides additional welfare gains compared to
any of the two-way results (Table 5). To avoid excessive calculations, we illustrate by
returning to the MNL model, which assumes no variation in stakeholder preferences.
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Table 5 reiterates that each pairwise analysis yields a different outcome. In particular,
when compared to the four-way solution, the two-way results tend to underestimate
the preferred levels of omitted services. Despite the differences in preferred levels of
each service, though, each two-way result produces a similar welfare gain. The point
estimates range from $49.23 – $55.83 per person. Contrast this with the four-way
solution, which generates a welfare gain of $72.31 per person. Though the overlapping
confidence intervals suggest the difference is statistically insignificant, it is consistent
with expectations that jointly optimizing for each service improves the outcome.

6. Conclusion

In this paper we combined empirical PPFs with results from a choice
experiment survey to explore heterogeneity in preferences for the ecosystem service
outcomes from dam removal. The production possibilities approach to navigating
ecosystem service tradeoffs is gaining traction, but requires incorporating public
preferences to effectively support decision making (Cord et al., 2017). Theoretically,
preferences for ecosystem service tradeoffs can be integrated using the concept of
indifference curves (Cavender-Bares et al., 2015). We provide an empirical
application, demonstrating how choice experiment results can be used in conjunction
with PPFs to support ecosystem service policies that match the needs of society. In
particular, we explore how the framework can be used to identify areas of agreement
and disagreement between stakeholder groups, and the consequences of simplifying
multidimensional tradeoffs to two-way analysis.
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We find that jointly analyzing a choice experiment and PPF yields insights that
are not apparent from individual analysis. For example, latent class analysis of our
choice experiment revealed differences in WTP between groups. When represented as
indifference curves and combined with the PPF, however, some of the apparent
differences become points of agreement. Specifically, the magnitude of disagreements
depends not only on preferences, but also on the shape of the PPF. We also note that
by representing preferences as indifference curves we can include the preferences of
people who refuse to value ecosystem services monetarily.
In addition, we find that care should be taken when reducing higher dimension
tradeoffs to two dimensions. In PPF models for ecosystem services, correlated services
are sometimes grouped or proxied onto a single axis (e.g., Mastrangelo and Laterra,
2015; Polasky et al., 2008) to ease visualization, comprehension, and computation.
Comparing our pairwise two-way results, though, indicates that the socially preferred
levels of services can be highly dependent on which services are omitted. Further, we
find lower welfare associated with solutions derived at two-dimensions compared to
four. One possibility is to derive results using all the relevant ecosystem services, but
utilize two-dimensional analysis to convey findings and facilitate discussions.
Our study has a few limitations which can be addressed in future research.
First, our choice experiment elicits preferences for all four ecosystem services jointly.
If services were omitted from the choice experiment in a way that matched the twoway PPF analyses, respondent preferences could differ and yield potentially more
consistent results (e.g., if respondents proxy the omitted services when expressing
their preferences). Future research could also test the welfare consequences of
113

bundling services in both the PPF and choice experiment into two groups.
Additionally, we ignore potentially important spatial factors. More research is needed
to develop a model that is spatially explicit in both ecosystem service production and
consumption, and to understand whether welfare gains warrant the additional
complexity. Nonetheless, we think combining choice experiments with PPF is a
promising framework for policymakers navigating ecosystem service tradeoffs.
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Figure 1. The Penobscot Watershed is the largest in the state of Maine
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Figure 2. Sample choice set

120

Figure 3. Two-dimensional PPFs for hydropower and lake shoreline plotted against
herring (inside) and salmon (outside)

121

Figure 4. Four-dimensional optimization results plotted in two dimensions
Note: Two-way PPF (red line) is the frontier of four-way results
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Figure 5. Marginal WTP (USD)
Note: WTP cannot be computed for Class 4.
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Figure 6. PPF combined with MNL results to identify utility maximizing outcome
Note: Shaded area represents 95% CI for slope of indifference curve
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Figure 7. Two-dimensional hydropower-salmon and lake shoreline-salmon PPFs with
indifference curves indicating preferred combinations by latent class
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Figure 8. Hydro-herring PPF (inner) overlaid on hydro-salmon PPF (outer) with utility
maximizing combinations by latent class
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Table 1. Regression results
Latent Class Model
Class 2
Class 3
(29%)
(24%)

Class 4
(8%)

MNL

Class 1
(39%)

StatQuo

-0.768***
(0.128)

-3.012***
(0.327)

1.799***
(0.573)

-4.351***
(0.992)

-2.199*
(1.293)

Salmon

0.028***
(0.008)

0.012
(0.014)

0.024
(0.027)

0.021
(0.026)

0.871*
(0.445)

Hydro

0.005***
(0.001)

0.005***
(0.001)

0.002
(0.003)

0.012***
(0.004)

0.005
(0.004)

Herring

0.015*
(0.008)

0.023**
(0.011)

0.062*
(0.033)

-0.115**
(0.050)

0.040
(0.061)

Lake

-0.117***
(0.023)

-0.075**
(0.036)

-0.266**
(0.123)

-0.508***
(0.125)

-1.460*
(0.859)

Cost

-0.005***
(0.000)

-0.005***
(0.001)

-0.004**
(0.001)

-0.022***
(0.004)

0
(Fixed)

LL

-869.1

-1163.3

Notes: N= 1205. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level, respectively.
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics by class

Class 1
0.37

Class 2
0.27

Class 3
0.25

Class 4
0.11

Male (proportion)

0.56
(0.06)

0.45
(0.07)

0.46
(0.07)

0.45
(0.11)

Income in $1,000s (mean)

69.9
(41.9)

78.3
(62.5)

84.3
(49.3)

84.4
(64.5)

Retired (proportion)

0.26
(0.05)

0.26
(0.06)

0.23
(0.06)

0.43
(0.11)

B.A. or higher (proportion)

0.60
(0.06)

0.56
(0.07)

0.65
(0.07)

0.64
(0.1)

15+ yr resident (proportion)

0.73
(0.05)

0.70
(0.06)

0.81
(0.05)

0.82
(0.08)

Own or visit a 'camp'
(proportion)

0.42
(0.06)

0.45
(0.07)

0.51
(0.07)

0.41
(0.10)

Identify as 'risk averse'
(proportion)

0.24
(0.05)

0.38
(0.07)

0.27
(0.06)

0.18
(0.08)

NEP Index of environmental
concern (mean)

4.53
(4.83)

2.25
(4.03)

2.96
(4.20)

5.71
(4.16)

Regular river recreational use
(proportion)

0.62
(0.06)

0.50
(0.07)

0.51
(0.07)

0.45
(0.11)

Good or excellent water quality
rating (proportion)

0.51
(0.06)

0.55
(0.07)

0.57
(0.07)

0.25
(0.10)

Previously aware of dam
removals (proportion)

0.72
(0.05)

0.66
(0.07)

0.67
(0.07)

0.80
(0.09)

Proportion of overall sample

Notes: N=204. Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table 3. Two-dimensional utility maximizing combinations by class
Class 1

Latent Class Model
Class 2
Class 3

Class 4

Salmon
1,000s of fish
% of max

11.04
50%

16.77
77%

6.74
31%

21.92
100%

Hydropower
1,000s of homes
% of max

146.87
95%

123.36
80%

155.06
100%

1.45
1%

-2.1
Slope of indifference curve
95% confidence interval (-4.1; -0.2)
Herring
12.74
Millions of fish
78%
% of max
Hydropower
1,000s of homes
% of max

133.24
86%

-4.3
Slope of indifference curve
95% confidence interval (-5.0; -3.6)
Salmon
1,000s of fish
17.96
% of max
82%
Lake shoreline
Miles lost
% of max

-10.0
(-11.4; -8.9)

-1.7
-168.1
(-1.8; -1.7) (-201.5; -135.3)

15.59
95%

0.26
2%

13.56
83%

104.78
68%

155.06
100%

128.58
83%

-25.3
9.55
(-28.8; -22.4) (9.00; 10.13)

3.0
<1%

-7.8
(-10.3; -5.3)

17.81
81%

17.81
81%

18.16
83%

1.0
<1%

1.0
<1%

11.0
2%

Slope of indifference curve
-0.16
-0.09
-0.04
-0.60
95% confidence interval (-0.32; -0.01) (-0.11; -0.08) (-0.04; -0.04) (-0.81; -0.44)
Herring
Millions of fish
14.84
14.67
0.26
12.28
% of max
90%
89%
2%
75%
Lake shoreline
Miles lost
% of max

30.0
6%

25.0
5%

Slope of indifference curve
-0.31
-0.23
95% confidence interval (-0.44; -0.22) (-0.27; -0.23)

0.0
0%

2.0
<1%

0.23
(0.21; 0.24)

-0.03
(-0.04; -0.02)

Note: Slope of indifference curve is the marginal rate of substitution between two services. Confidence
intervals are simulated using Krinsky and Robb procedure with 1,000 draws.
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Table 4. Four-dimensional utility maximizing combinations by class
Class 1

Latent Class Model
Class 2
Class 3

Class 4

Salmon
1,000s of fish
% of max

15.56
71%

17.92
82%

5.14
23%

18.14
83%

Hydropower
1,000s of homes
% of max

130.03
84%

104.78
68%

155.06
100%

105.58
68%

Herring
Millions of fish
% of max

12.20
74%

14.67
89%

0.26
2%

12.74
78%

Lake shoreline
Miles lost
% of max

20.0
4%

27.0
5%

0.0
0%

12.0
2%

130

131

12.34
75%
89.5
18%

106.4
21%

134.69
87%

130.03
84%
11.92
73%

14.30
65%

15.82
72%

3.0
<1%

10.90
66%

95.32
61%

17.96
82%

Two-dimensional optimizations
Hydro
Lakes
Herring
Salmon

18.0
4%

14.19
86%

95.32
61%

17.88
82%

Lakes
Herring

20.0
4%

12.87
78%

124.00
80%

16.44
75%

Fourdimensional
optimization

Notes: Shaded results represent the outcomes for the omitted services that result from maximizing utility
based only on the other (non-shaded) services. Confidence intervals for welfare estimates are obtained from
Krinsky and Robb procedure using 1,000 draws.

Welfare gain (USD)
49.23
50.98
50.35
55.83
72.31
95% CI
(21.96; 75.90) (25.48; 78.06) (23.84; 78.32) (24.05; 87.30) (42.26; 101.29)

Salmon
1,000s of fish
% of max
Hydropower
1,000s of homes
% of max
Herring
Millions of fish
% of max
Lake shoreline
Miles lost
% of max

Hydro
Salmon

Table 5. Welfare estimates derived from MNL with two- and four- way optimizations

